Toward better times: Transition to democracy in the Czech Republic by Hemon, Nataša
 
 
CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE 








TOWARD BETTER TIMES: TRANSITION TO 















CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE 




TOWARD BETTER TIMES: TRANSITION TO 



























   
I declare that I have written this Bachelor Diploma P per myself and on my own. I have 
duly referenced and quoted all the material and sources that I used in it. This Paper has not 
yet been submitted to obtain any degree.  
 
  
In Prague on 6.5.2016.                                          Signature: Hemon Nataša 
 






This thesis is an interdisciplinary analysis of theprocess of democratic transition in the 
Czech Republic in the time period from 1989 until 2004. The main objective of this 
research is to provide the reader with a more holistic approach to the process of 
democratization and to determine whether democracy in the Czech Republic can be 
considered as the “only game in the town.” The thesis starts with the different theoretical 
explanations of what democracy actually is. What follows later is an explanation of 
Huntington’s 3rd wave of democracy and brief history of the Czech Republic. The main 
part of this thesis is an analysis of the Czech democratization process based on Linz & 
Stepan’s five arenas of the consolidated democracy. Civil society, political society, a rule 
of law, state bureaucracy and economic society are five arenas of consolidated democracy 
that will be analyzed separately in this thesis.  
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1989 was a revolutionary year that changed the course of history. It is a year when the 
Soviet Union neared to its end and communist ideology faded and started falling into 
oblivion. Furthermore, it is a year when the East and West finally destroyed the walls which 
were separating them for decades. The peaceful revolutions in Prague, Budapest, Warsaw 
and Berlin gloriously opened their gates for the arriv l of the long-awaited changes inherent 
in democracy. A whole new era was knocking on the doors of the European continent. 
The demise of the Soviet Union, the ascending power of the United States and the rise of 
Fukuyama’s theory that liberal democracy is the best po sible form of government, made 
a perfect environment for massive democratization in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, democracy nd capitalism were praised and 
glorified while it was preached that communism simply lost because it was a worse system 
than capitalism (Fukuyama, 2006). Almost three decas later, the situation has changed 
and the efficiency of liberal democracy is questioned. For instance, Slavoj Žižek (2011), a 
prominent, neo- Marxist argued that the “The eternal m rriage between capitalism and 
democracy is over.” However, this “marriage” as Fukuyama claims was of historical 
necessity and was the only viable alternative for the new sick man of Europe at the 
beginning of the 90s. Therefore, we should not underestimate the value of democracy itself, 
but we should rather investigate how the democratization process was conducted in each 
country. But first we may ask ourselves what democracy actually is. Is it as Tocqueville 
(2010) states “tyranny of majority” (p.410) or will of the majority of people? The answer 
to this question is complex and there are various theories that try to explain the notion of 
democracy. The still controversial debate about what actually constitutes democracy will 
follow in Chapter 2.
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Central and Eastern Europe countries used to live in non-democratic, post- 
totalitarian systems for almost half of the century. During all these years, Central and 
Eastern European countries were patronized and occupied by the Soviet Union. The East 
and West used to be two parallel worlds and realitis, separated by the Iron Curtain. The 
fall of Iron Curtain in 1989 brought a huge geopolitical change which opened new paths 
towards democracy in a whole region. One of the countries which was on the crossroad in 
1989 and followed the democratic path was the Czech Republic (at that time still 
Czechoslovakia). 
The Czech Republic underwent a process of democratic t nsition and structurally 
has changed a lot. However, installation of a democratic regime is not exclusively a matter 
of removal of the previous oppressive regime, but it also depends on the efficacy of 
democratic reforms which will follow after.  Consequently, we can deal with an enormous 
gap between quasi or incomplete democracies and consolidated democracies. Mere 
elections are not enough to call one country consolidated democratic, but there is a vast 
amount of other factors which make one country a consolidated democracy. Therefore, the 
question which is being posed now is to which extent transition to democracy was 
successful in the Czech Republic? What are the reasons which make us attach the label of 
consolidated democracy to the Czech Republic? Why do political scientists use the case of 
the Czech Republic as an example of successful democratization process? As indicators of 
the democratic consolidation, this thesis will investigate five arenas of democratic 
consolidation established by Linz & Stephan in their book Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe.  
The main objective of this thesis is to provide a re der with more holistic and 
comprehensive view on all factors of democratizations in the Czech Republic. The working 
hypothesis of this paper is that democracy in the Cz ch Republic “is only game in the town” 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.5). This thesis will try to support this working hypothesis with 
both theoretical explanations and empirical data. 
 The research will focus on democratization measures which occurred in the time 
span from 1989 till 2004. We can divide the period of democratization into two phases. 
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The period from 1989 till 1993 can be considered as the first phase of the democratic 
development in back then still existing Czechoslovakia. The second phase began with the 
creation of the independent Czech Republic and lasted until 2004. 2004 is of tremendous 
importance for the Czech Republic. It is a year when the Czech Republic entered the 
European Union together with nine other, mostly post-c mmunist countries. EU 
membership could be seen as a triumph of more than a decade long struggle for democratic 
consolidation. However, some negative aspects of a c mmunist heritage remained deeply 
rooted in the Czech society so we may anticipate there is a still place for democratic 
changes and improvements in every sphere. Undoubtedly, Czechs’ battle with democracy 
cannot be solely ascribed to communist legacy, but there is a vast amount of other actors 
and factors that were involved. Due to the thesis’s limitedness in pages and vast complexity 
of the topic, this paper will deal with democratic changes until 2004. In addition, the 
majority of democratic reforms had actually occurred before 2004 since they were the 
precondition for the accession.  
 The limitation of this thesis, is the fact that it cannot capture process of democratic 
transition in the Czech Republic as a whole.  What we will observe in this analysis are the 
reforms which occurred in a limited time span. Thus, this research won’t be able to explain 
democratic changes which occurred outside the time, more precisely after 2004. Another 
limitation to the thesis might be the lack of more c oss-country comparisons of the Czech 
Republic with other CEE countries in transition.  
 The structure of this paper is following. Chapter 2 will firstly provide a reader with 
the theoretical ground of democracy. Secondly, Chapter 2 will focus on the explanation of 
Huntington’s 3rd wave of democratization and unique political atmosphere during the 
period of the Cold War. This will give a reader a universal picture of one whole epoch and 
help him better understand democratization in the Cz ch Republic. Thirdly, after the setting 
of both the theoretical and historical background, the emphasis will be shifted to the brief 
history of the Czech Republic, as well as on the nature of the Czech democratization 
process. The core of Chapter 3 will be an analysis of the main actors of a consolidated 
democracy. As previously mentioned, empirical, in-depth analysis will be based on the 
Linz’s five areas of a consolidated democracy which are following: civil society, political 
society, rule of law, state bureaucracy and economic society. With both qualitative and 
 4   
 
quantitative analysis of these five arenas, our optimis ic, working hypothesis will be either 
confirmed or rejected. Finally, in Chapter 4 of the t sis, the outcome of the previous 
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2. Nation of Velvet vs. Democracy 
The Velvet Revolution and the Velvet Divorce are historical events that added the epithet 
“velvet” to Czechoslovak society. The reason for ascribing the epithet “velvet” lays in a 
fact that both upheavals occurred peacefully, withou  violence and bloodshed. “Nation of 
Velvet” was “living a lie” until “the power or the powerless” won and overthrew a deeply 
rotten regime. Only then, “Nation of Velvet” started “living the truth” (Havel, 1985, p.40)  
The main task of this thesis is to profoundly analyze democratic struggle in the 
Czech Republic. However, our analysis wouldn’t be complete without giving a solid 
background on both democracy and historical facts. In order to understand democratic 
reforms, we need to analyze and re-evaluate reasons why communism stayed engraved in 
Czechoslovakia for almost half of the century. These reasons will later have implications 
on democratic transition and consolidation.  
Consolidated democracy approach will be used in this t esis as something that 
supersedes mere democratization. Democratic consolidati n can be considered as the 
product of successful struggle for democracy. The Cz ch Republic is surely a democratic 
country, but what this thesis is going to show is to which extent the Czech Republic is a 
consolidated democracy.  
 
2.1 On democracy  
 Democratic consolidation is a different and more complex task than the mere transition to 
democracy. According to Huntington (1993), democratization includes: a) the end of 
authoritarian regime, b) the installation of a democratic regime and c) the consolidation of 
the democratic regime (p. 35).  This indicates thate end of an authoritarian regime does 
not necessarily imply democratic consolidation. In majority of the cases after the 
establishing of a democratic regime, there are still many improvements and requirements 
that should be fulfilled. Therefore, preconditions for labeling one country a “consolidated 
democracy” are more demanding and exacting. But firs ly it is crucial to explain the 
meaning of a word democracy. The concept of democracy is not a monolith, even on the 
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opposite it should be considered as “a developmental phenomenon” (Diamond, 1999, p. 
18). 
It is of great importance to understand a difference between direct and 
representative democracy. Direct democracy is a form f democratic governance where 
people, without mediators, are engaged in the decision-making process. Conversely, 
representative or indirect democracy is a form of democracy where people elect their 
representatives as defenders of their interests in the decision-making policies. For instance, 
Aristotle, in the time when only direct democracy had been practiced, noticed that 
democracy was not flawless. He described democracy as “deviant constitution” and 
highlighted the possible danger of democracy turning to despotism (Aristotle, 1999).   
 Debates and disagreements about which form of democratic governance is better: 
direct or representative, have always been present. On the one side, Jean Jacques Rousseau 
completely refuses the notion of representative democracy with explanation that every 
member of community invests himself and all his powers to “one supreme direction of the 
general will” while “creating an artificial and corporate body” in form of government 
(Rousseau, 1998, book I, ch.6). Rousseau (1998), as an advocate of the direct form of 
democracy, criticizes the idea of political representation as form which “degrades humanity 
and dishonours the name of man” (book III, ch.15). On the other side, many others have 
noticed flaws of direct democracy, as well as the extreme urgency to create a representative 
body which will support citizens’ interests indirectly. Madison in his essay The Federalist 
No. 10 highlighted the danger of possible fractions in the society which may lead to 
divisions and disputes over fundamental issues. In Madison’s view, direct democracy is a 
potential threat for citizen’s individual right, thus, he favors representative democracy as a 
main guardian of individual rights from the rule of majority (Madison, 2003, pp. 119-120). 
Furthermore, Dahl pointed out that “ ‘Madisonian’ theory of democracy is an effort to bring 
off a compromise between the power of majorities and the power of minorities, between 
the political equality of all adult citizens on the one side, and the desire to limit their 
sovereignty on the other” (Dahl, Madisonian Democracy, 2003, p. 207). 
 With the gradual shift to representative forms of democracy, the question of the 
elections became problematized. Electoral democracy is ommonly described in terms of 
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holding free elections.  Thus, it is possible to define electoral democracy or as Schumpeter 
(1996) calls it “democratic method” as a system where r presentatives are being elected by 
competitive institutionalized elections. Authors like Schumpeter and Przeworski are 
advocates of minimalist concept of democracy. However, it may appear that competitive, 
institutionalized elections are not sufficient in order to call one country democratic since 
there may be the problem with wrong political representation and noncompliance with 
electoral promises. Electoral democracy neglects many other aspects of democratic rule 
such as rule of law and civil rights so this can be labeled as a fallacy of electoralism 
(Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 6). Due to the vagueness in previous attempts to determine 
what comprises democracy we can continue with Robert Dahl who proposes a set of 
procedural criteria which constitute a new concept of democracy- polyarchy. Polyarchies 
provide a certain level of liberalization to citizens as well as fairness, inclusiveness and 
competitiveness of elections (Dahl, 1956). Dahl’s polyarchy is a slightly expanded version 
of minimalist approach to democracy. Besides free el ctions, polyarchy includes political 
and civil freedoms which are highly important for the organization of pre-electoral 
campaign and various political debates. However, polyarchies are seen as non-
institutionalized or of poor institutionalization (O'Donnell, 1996). Stemming from this, O’ 
Donnell (1994) introduces the category of delegative democracies characterized by very 
weak democratic institutions and a strong head of state. Delegative democracies are not 
consolidated and they are typical for Latin America’s presidential systems (p. 56).   
 Nowadays, the most embraced form of democracy is a liberal democracy which is 
promulgated by Fukuyama (2006) as “the final form of human government”(p. xi).  Liberal 
democracy is being characterized by free, fair, institutionalized elections, protection of 
basic human and civil rights, rule of law, separation of powers etc. Besides Fukuyama’s 
and Huntington’s rather great affection toward liberal democracy, Fareed Zakaria (1997) 
developed the concept of illiberal democracies. Zakari  points out the importance of 
“marriage” between constitutional liberalism and democracy, which reflects in the liberal 
democracy. A constitutional liberalism is about attaining government’s goals and assuring 
individual rights which together constitute the Western form of liberal democracy. For 
Zakaria, democracy without constitutional liberalism is rather defective and dangerous 
since it may cause erosion of “bundle of freedoms” and cast some doubt on democratic 
 8   
 
governance of liberal democracy as such (Zakaria, 1997, pp. 1-13). Despite free elections 
in illiberal democracies, citizens are often deprived of some civil or political rights. Illiberal 
democracies can fall into the category of what Larry Diamond denominates as “hybrid 
regimes” which are somewhere in between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes 
(Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, 2002). 
Nevertheless, a perfect, utopian society does not exist so there is no perfect form of 
governance. Hence, the objective of this explanatory pa t about democracy was not to judge 
whether democracy is a good or bad form of governance, but rather to provide a reader 
with several perspectives of defining democracy. Putting aside all these miscellaneous 
definitions of what democracy is and what is not, we need to make a step toward the 
defining a consolidated democracy.  The democratic consolidation approach is immensely 
significant for this thesis since we will try to asse s democratization in the Czech Republic 
in accordance with democratic consolidation standards. Consolidated democracy can be 
conceived as a crown of the whole process of democratization. According to Linz& 
Stephan (1996), consolidated democracy can be interpret d from three, different 
standpoints. Behaviorally, democracy is consolidate when there are no serious political, 
national, economic or institutional factors which may jeopardize democratic regime or try 
secession from the state. Attitudinally, consolidate  democracy requires that the majority 
has confidence in democratic procedures and institutions while sharing the common belief 
that any political modification should be in line with democratic processes and institutions. 
Constitutionally, a democratic regime becomes consolidated “when all the actors in the 
polity became habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the 
established norms and that violation of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and 
costly.” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 5-6) Thus, consolidated democracy is more complex 
and stretches further from the realm of electoral democracy. Later on, democratic transition 
in the Czech Republic will be analyzed according to five interacting arenas of a 
consolidated democracy. 
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2.2 The third wave of democratization 
Huntington’s 3rd wave of democratization began with a collapse of the authoritarian regime 
in Portugal in 1974 (Huntington, 1993, p. 21).  This change was a prelude for the upcoming 
upheavals all over the world. Huntington (1993) denot s this phenomenon as domino effect 
or snowballing (p. 100). However, the third wave gained momentum and seized the Central 
and Eastern European countries only after 1989. After 1989 the USSR “protective, 
hegemonic umbrella” which restricted and determined both internal and external affairs of 
the states disappeared and the 3rd wave of democratization began. 
After the WWII, the world was veiled with a hope in a restoration of the multilateral 
cooperation of states which was followed by the immediate resurgence of the great, still 
functioning institutions: NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and European 
Economic Community (today renamed to the European Union). Soviet response to both 
the structural and functional gathering of the Western powers resulted in the establishment 
of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and NATO’s military 
counterpart- the Warsaw Pact. Both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, vastly inspired by 
the Communist ideology, clustered together Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as seven 
satellite states.  
While the democratization wave had been successfully circulating all over the 
Western Europe and the United States, Central and Eastern European countries still 
remained in communist, political deadlock. End of bipolarity and long-term, smoldering 
tension between the Unites States and the Soviet Union , commonly known as a Cold War, 
came with the collapse of the USSR. This appeared to be he perfect occasion to overthrow 
the post-totalitarian communist regimes. Huntington (1993) has noted that there are several 
key factors that had a strong impact on the 3rd wave of democratization. 
Firstly, the legitimacy of the Communist ideology exp rienced an excessive 
decline. It is essential to understand that the linkage between Communism and the Soviet 
Union was unbreakable. With the rise of skepticism toward the Communist ideology, the 
situation in the Soviets only worsened. The main source of the Communist ideology was 
founded in Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Nevertheless, Lenin’s “heaven on earth” was not 
possible to be established; socioeconomic inequalities gradually emerged on the surface 
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which started to make a stratified, class society (Huntington, 1993, pp. 46-59). 
Furthermore, economic backwardness burdened the state and the Soviet Union became a 
slave of its ideology. New sources of legitimacy for the Communism were not available 
since they were totally opposite from the core, ideological principles of Communist 
ideology.  
Secondly, the ground for the blossoming of democracy was economic development. 
Soviet centrally planned economy simply wasn’t able to catch up with the growth and 
development of the Western market economy. Subsequently, GNP per capita of the 
Western countries was profusely higher than Soviet on s (Huntington, 1993, pp. 59-72).  
Just for an illustration of huge disparity between the West and East, we can take a look 
back to period from 1973-1989 when the level of the income in the CEE countries fell 
down from nearly one- half to marginally more than one-third of Western’s ones (Berend, 
2009, p. 34) (Table 1). On the other side, the United States, one of the cradles of the 
capitalist, market economy, was labeled as a promised land, as well as the most prosperous 
one. The beginning of the 1990s are knowns as the golden era of the United States- 
centered, Western hegemony. In 1989, IMF, WB, and the US Treasury Department 
launched the set of 10 prescriptions widely known as Washington Consensus. It was 
designed for the still vulnerable economies in transition for both America and the CEE 
countries. The main emphasize of the package was put on the liberalization of the trade, 
privatization, and deregulation (Berend, 2009, p. 42). However, Washington Consensus 
was not left without sharp criticism. Namely, Joseph Stiglitz, a world- famous, American 
economist, later expressed his critical view towards the Washington prescriptions. In his 
opinion, privatization should have been conducted more carefully without focusing on the 
speed of transition. The Shock Therapy was too abrupt for the barely functioning CEE 
markets. Similarly, Lawrence Klein advocated the Asian approach to transitions which was 
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Table 1.  Per capita GDP of Central and East Europe as a percentage of 
                Western European GDP 
Country 1973 1989 
Central and Eastern Europe* 49 37 
Czechoslovakia   42 36 
Hungary 57 51 
Poland 45 40 
Poland  43 33 
Romania 28 23 
Soviet Union 49 42 
Yugoslavia 34 35 
*     Un-weighted average. 
       Source: Maddison, 1995a:201 as cited in (Berend, 2009, p. 34) 
 
Thirdly, modernization of religion as well as some attitudinal changes which 
occurred within it, helped promote democracy, but also considerably weakened the 
Communist ideology on the other side. Protestantism has always been deeply associated 
with capitalism. Weber argues that Protestant ascetics contributed to an accumulation of 
the capital and rise of modern capitalist spirit (as cited in Fulcher & Scott, 2011, pp. 397-
398). Accordingly, as previously stated, the advanced economy of capitalism is a solid 
background for the installation of democracy and democratic institutions. However, 
Catholic Church had not been always associated with democracy, but rather with the local, 
authoritarian regime in Latin America. The breaking point occurred during the mid-1960s 
when Catholic stopped supporting authoritarian regim s in Latin America. The event 
which shaken the Communist ideology was when the Pope J hn Paul II, openly supported 
Polish opposition (Solidarity). Later on, the Pope supported other democratizations as well 
(Huntington, 1993, pp.73-85). 
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Lastly, the dramatic change in the external policies occurred both from the Western 
and Soviet side. The European Community became more numerous and attracted other 
countries to join. The Community was seen as a good gr und for economic development, 
welfare, and prosperity. The European Community, as a defender of human rights and 
democracy, organized the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
usually known as the Helsinki Accords. The signatories of the Helsinki Accord were the 
United States, Canada, and all European countries except Albania. The Conference opened 
the Pandora’s Box concerning human rights of the CEE countries. As Huntington (1993) 
claimed, “Helsinki was an incentive and weapon for reformers to use in attempting to open 
up their societies” (p.90).  In the same vein, juston he other side of the Atlantic, the United 
States, at the beginning of the 1970s also became engag d in defending human rights. This 
policy slightly changed during the 1980s with the arriv l of neoliberal, extremely anti-
communist tide headed by American President Regan. Reagan’s administration adopted a 
more aggressive approach in which “they promote democratic change in both communist 
and non-communist dictatorships” (Huntington, 1993, p.93). The United States’ 
administration meddled in other countries’ state affairs by using various methods, from 
economic sanctions to diplomatic actions in order to promote democratization. 
(Huntington, 1993, pp. 85-98).  
The foreign policy of the Soviets gradually started o change when new-elected 
President Gorbachev introduced new liberalization reforms perestroika (“rebuilding”) and 
glasnost (“openness”).With these reforms, Gorbachev abolished t  Brezhnev Doctrine 
which meant that the Soviet Union administration would not intervene in countries’ affairs 
anymore. As a result, each country had a right to decide about both its internal and external 
policies (Huntington, 1993, p.85-100).  
These were the main actors which initiated the 3rd wave of democratization. What 
followed in 1989 was the massive snowballing effect in whole CEE Europe. 
 
 13   
 
2.3 Czechoslovakia before 1989 
In order to understand the democratic transition, we need to briefly examine the history of 
the Czech Republic which vastly influenced the democratization process. Huntington 
points out that there is a huge correlation between consolidation success and previous 
experience with democracy. Prior democratic experience is only an advantage for 
countries’ later experiments with democracy. (Huntington, 1993, pp. 270-271).  
Czechoslovakia firstly implemented democracy in 1918 when it officially got 
independence as one of Austro-Hungarian successor states. With diplomatic skills of 
Masaryk who lobbied for the independence, Czechoslovakia was one of the states which 
profited from the Versailles Treaty. In the post- WWI period when almost all East 
European countries fell under some form of authoritarian regime, Czechoslovakia was one 
of the rare countries which embraced democracy and became a functioning parliamentary 
democracy (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 21).Being far from an ideal type of democratic state, 
Czechoslovakia had a problem with national minorities that were creating an unstable 
political party system and fragmentations in the Parliament. Namely, Czechoslovakia was 
an extremely diverse and heterogeneous state. In the Czech lands, a considerably large 
German minority used to live, while in Slovakia, the Hungarian minority was very 
numerous. Moreover, a significant number of both Jews and Poles were living on the 
territory of Czechoslovakia (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 8). 
With the Munich Agreement in 1938, Czechoslovakia ws annexed by German 
Nazi forces. Czechoslovakia became a victim of geopolitical manipulations and prey which 
was given to Hitler to satisfy his wish for territoial expansion. What followed after the 
annexation was the establishment of the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 
spring, 1939. By this act of scarifying their sovereignty, Czechoslovaks felt betrayed by 
the West. As a consequence, they developed some sort of negative attitude and animosity 
towards their previous Western allies. This negative attitude toward the West created the 
conducive and fruitful ground for the rise of communism. (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 40) With 
the Košice Government Program in 1945, the communist party with Klement Gottwald 
took the leading role in the state and abolished right-wing parties. What followed was an 
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additional strengthening of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KŠC) under the patronage 
of Moscow.    
During the mid-1940s, a series of decrees promulgated by the President Edward 
Beneš came into force. The most controversial one was prescribed for the expulsion of 
Germans, Nazi criminals, traitors, and their collabor tors from the Czechoslovakia. This 
contributed to relatively homogeneous Czechoslovakia. Until 1989, Czechs constituted 
94% of the whole Czech Republic’s territory, while in Slovakia 87% population were 
Slovaks (as cited in Leff Skalnik, 1996, p. 9). Ethnical homogeneity of the Czech Republic 
later facilitated democratic transition since it created a relatively stable political system 
without ethnic cleavages between parties.  
In May, 1946, last free elections were held in Czechoslovakia and Klement 
Gottwald, leader of the KSČ, formed a government and became the prime minister. After 
the “Glorious February Revolution” in 1948, all non-communist ministers resigned in order 
to express their dissent toward the illegalities of KSČ. Formal and fraud parliamentary 
elections followed in May, 1948 with the KSČ winning the elections. In July, 1948 
President Edvard Beneš resigned and Klement Gottwald became the new president (Leff 
Skalinik, 1996, pp. 48-51) Inspired by the Moscow Trials, the communist government 
initiated harsh processes with Milada Horáková and Heliodor Píka who were accused of 
being “class enemies” and conspirators against regim . 
After the death of Stalin and Gottwald in 1953, new debates about the style of 
governance emerged. Very soon it was visible that the Soviet Model of the economy was 
inappropriate for the already developed Czechoslovak economy. In fact, Czechoslovakia 
was already industrialized in comparison to the Soviet Union.  However, Czechoslovakia 
needed to conform to Soviet centrally planned economy and the Five- Years Plans (Leff 
Skalnik, 1996, pp.51-55).  In the mid-60s, Ota Šik attempted to introduce a set of economic 
reforms which would have been a step toward a mixed economy. In 1968, Aleksandr 
Dubček- the newly elected head of  the KŠC, became “a crusader for a reform, the 
embodiment of ‘socialism with human face’.” He wanted a reformation of the KŠC in 
which the party “would retain its leading role, but this time by earning it in responding to 
population needs and demands”(Leff Skalnik, 1996, p.57). Dubček’s de-Stalinization 
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reforms and his attempt to create democratic socialism remarked the beginning of peaceful 
revolution of 1968, better known as Prague Spring. 
Dubček’s swift and genuinely revolutionary reforms of freedom of the press, as 
well as other liberalization policies, created a potential threat to Moscow. The Soviet 
leadership feared that these reforms in Czechoslovakia could create a domino effect in 
other CEE countries (Valenta, 1991, p. 12) . Soviet reaction to architects of these reforms 
and to Prague Spring was vigorous and brutal suppression. This culminated in July 1968 
at The Conference at Čierna nad Tisou where after long negotiations and bargaining, 
Dubček, pressed by Brezhnev promised to avoid anti- socialist tendencies. Immediately 
after Čierna nad Tisou Conference,  the Bratislava Declaration also tried to solve 
Czechoslovak crisis. Both the Čierna and Bratislava conferences were the last tries of 
noninterventionist side to prevent a military engagement. Eventually, on August 21, 1968, 
Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military invaded Czechoslovakia. Moreover, this act was justified 
by the announcement of a previously mentioned Brezhn v Doctrine. (Valenta, 1991) This 
signaled the end of Prague Spring and the entry into a ew, obscure  period of normalization 
by which Czechoslovakia fell into an almost thirty years long period of lethargy and 
stagnation. It was a moment when all hopes and illusions of better future deeply sank into 
oblivion. 
The so- called “normalization” period lasted from 1969 until 1989.  It was a period 
of demoralized political silence, extinguished civil life, no political pluralism, and almost 
no parallel society. Freedom of expression, arts and literature were strongly censored and 
restricted. Samizdats, one of the rare forms of alternative culture, were underground 
dissident publications that used to circulate from eader to reader. Political society became 
ossified and monotonous, with “sclerotic” bureaucracies (Mansfeldová, 2006, p. 101). A 
glimmer of hope appeared after the Helsinki Accords when Czechoslovak society gradually 
started to wake up. Thus, in 1977 Charter 77 emerged as an informal, clandestine civic 
initiative that was comprised of the group of urban, spiritual intellectuals, dissidents, artists 
and students against the regime. As drafted in Ma ifesto of Charter 77 (1977) “Charter 77 
is a loose, informal and open association of people f various shades of opinion, faiths and 
professions united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of 
civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world”(p.3). Until 1989, 
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there was no significant and politically structured opposition, but rather quite rare protest 
groups. Right this generation of members of Charter 77, including Vaclav Havel, 
established the Civic Forum in 1989 and played the most significant role during the Velvet 
Revolution (Leff Skalnik, 1996, p.61).  
 
2.4 The Velvet Revolution and the beginning of transition   
As previously explained in Chapter 2.2, the fall of Brezhnev Doctrine allowed the 3rd wave 
of democratization to victoriously enter and progress all around Central and Eastern 
Europe. The new doctrine which replaced Brezhnev Doctrine was symbolically called 
“Sinatra Doctrine” upon a singer Frank Sinatra and his song My Way. This doctrine allowed 
every country, which was previously under the Soviet umbrella, to choose its own reforms 
and to follow “its own way.”  
According to Linz& Stephan (1996), Czechoslovak regime from 1968 until 1989 
can fall into the category of the frozen post-totalitarian-by-decay regime. In the frozen post- 
totalitarian regimes  “Despite the persistent tolerance of some civil society critics of the 
regime, almost all other control mechanisms of the party-state stay in place for a long 
period and do not evolve ”(p.42). This was clearly the case of Czechoslovakia since  back 
then, the government was “a prisoner of the legacy of the invasion of 1968 not only as 
regards policy but also respecting the selection of personnel” (Wheaton & Kavan, 1992, p. 
35). From another standpoint, the previous regime in Czechoslovakia could be classified 
as bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. This type was specific for countries that had 
experienced democracy in inter-war period as Czechoslovakia surely did. Furthermore, in 
political terms, bureaucratic- autoritorian communism corresponds with already reached 
certain level of industralization and rests upon a techoncratic structure of government that 
does not tolerate any political diversity(Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski& Toka, 1999, 
pp.25-26). 
Vaclav Havel (1985) in his notable essay The Power of The Powerless explained 
his resentment toward post-totalitarian reality: 
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“Between the aims of the post-totalitarian system and the aims of life there is a 
yawning abyss: while life, in its essence, moves toward plurality, diversity, 
independent self-constitution, and self-organization, n short, toward the fulfillment 
of its own freedom, the post-totalitarian system demands conformity, uniformity, 
and discipline. While life ever strives to create new and improbable structures, the 
post-totalitarian system contrives to force life into its most probable states. The 
aims of the system reveal its most essential characteristic to be introversion, a 
movement toward being ever more completely and unreserv dly itself, which 
means that the radius of its influence is continually widening as well. This system 
serves people only to the extent necessary to ensur that people will serve it” (pp. 
29-30). 
However, the frozen post-totalitarian regime in Czechoslovakia neared its end in 
1989. Prelude to 1989 upheavals started in 1988 with a series of commemoration events 
such as Candle demonstration in Bratislava and Palach Week in Prague. Initially, 
Czechoslovak society was more or less passively observing events in their neighbor, post-
communist countries without serious. Negotiations between communist authorities and 
opposition led by Solidarity in Poland resulted in the Round Table Agreement at the 
beginning of April 1989. Similarly, Hungarian, communist government tried both to 
accommodate and to find a compromise with the opposition.  The fall of the Berlin Wall 
on November 9, 1989, additionally aroused smoldering aspirations for the change in 
Czechoslovakia (Leff Skalnik, 1996, p. 76). The final dismantling of communist regime 
started on November 17, when the mere commemoration of International Day of Students 
and the murder of Jan Opletal turned to mass demonstrations. Protestors were mainly 
students and urban dissidents who struggled to find an appropriate solution for regime 
deadlock. After several days of protests, significant changes started to happen. On 
November 24, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Miloš Jakeš 
resigned while being replaced with Karel Urbánek. The protests spread and mobilized even 
more people. Nevertheless, the key link for the success of demonstration was mobilization 
of working class, not only in Prague and Bratislava, but all around Czechoslovakia. The 
Velvet Revolution’s euphoria reached massive characte  on November 27, when 75 percent 
of workers all over Czechoslovakia joined a two-hour general and expressed their 
 18   
 
dissatisfaction with a regime. This was only a testfor he opposition which confirmed that 
they had huge public support for a regime change. On November 29, the General Assembly 
annulled Article 4 of the Czechoslovak constitution that stipulated the leading role of the 
communist party. This opened a legal space for the em rgence of new parties.  By 
December 4, Gustav Husák,” the President of Forgetting, “as Milan Kundera called him, 
also submitted his resignation (as cited in Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.320).  Finally, on 
December 29 Vaclav Havel was elected by the communist Parliament as a president of 
Czechoslovakia. An interim, transitional government was made as a coalition between the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and an opposition group Civic Forum with the 
President Vaclav Havel. The first, free, democratic elections were scheduled for July 1990. 
Vaclav Havel was re-elected as a President and the Fed ral Government was formed from 
Civic Forum and its Slovak pendant Public Against Violence (Linz& Stepan, 1996, pp.320-
327).  
Political scientists have different theories and names for the regime change that 
occurred in Czechoslovakia after 1989.  According to Linz &Stephan, the situation in 
Czechoslovakia didn’t lead to pacted or negotiated transition as it happened in Poland and 
Hungary. The Polish almost authoritarian and the Hungarian mature post-totalitarian 
regime had relatively strong oppositions, as well as communist authorities that were ready 
to negotiate. On the contrary, “Czechoslovak hard-line regime gave no space for reformists 
moderates in the party state” and opposition despit huge moral presence “had no 
negotiating capacity with the regime and indeed was not institutionally organized to 
conduct strategic and tactical negotiations.”(Linz& Stepan, 1996, pp.321-322). This 
engendered simple collapse of a regime which is a different model from negotiated 
transition or overturn of the regime. In Huntington’s words (1993), Czechoslovakian 
transition can be classified as transplacement. Transpl cement is a result of both the 
government’s and the opposition’s unreadiness to make some radical steps which may 
result either in transformation or replacement (p.151). While Kitschelt et al. classify 
Czechoslovakian regime change as an implosion. Implosion occurred “where the elites, 
based on monolithic coherence of the communist party machines and long-standing support 
from working class, intransigently refused to bargain for change, thus delaying any further 
reform that would have enabled them to rescue some f their resources into a post-
 19   
 
communist order” (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p.31).Thus, in Czechoslovakian case, back than 
still ruling communist party simply succumbed under the pressure of mass protests. 
What followed after the Velvet Revolution are extensive reforms and changes in 
every sphere.  On the one side, two factors already mentioned, relatively alleviated Czech 
transition to democracy: firstly, previous experienc  with democracy which is in 
Czechoslovakian case more than 9 years (Huntington, 1993, p. 271) and secondly, 
Czechoslovakia is relatively ethnically clean with no sizeable minorities. As Linz & 
Stephan (1996) argued “The more the population of the territory of the state is composed 
of pluri-national, lingual or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes an 
agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy will be difficult” (p. 29). On the other side, 
dissolution of the Czechoslovakia interrupted and impeded transition of both republics. 
The Velvet Divorce will be subject to analysis in next Chapter.  
 
2.5 The Velvet Divorce 
The Velvet Divorce entered the history in an unusual w y. It was a dissolution of one 
ethnofederal state that passed without war and violence which is an extremely rare 
occurrence. The result of this divorce was a bifurcation of Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic to two new, independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The dissolution 
occurred on January 1, 1993, in the middle of the turbulent period of transition which was 
surely a huge stumbling stone for the further progress. Luckily, Czechoslovakia didn’t 
share the Yugoslavian scenario and two divorced states continued to prosper towards 
democracy and the European Union more or less proporti nately. What we will investigate 
now are potential factors and reasons that had impact on Velvet Divorce. 
There has always been respective socio-cultural and historical discrepancy between 
Czech-lands and Slovakia. Namely, Czech-lands, as the heartland of early European 
industrialization, were more economically developed un er the influence of the Austrian 
part of Austro-Hungarian Empire. On the contrary, Slovakia was a more agrarian and 
undeveloped economy, controlled by the Hungarian half of the empire (Linz & Stepan, 
1996, p. 328).  Moreover, Czechs were more secular due to weakening of religious 
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influence during the centuries, while Slovaks were mainly Catholic oriented. However, 
neither the relative backwardness of Slovakia nor cultural-religious differences contributed 
significantly to the collapse of Czechoslovakia.  
 Public will of the people as one of the potential sources of the separation could also 
be rejected.  Paradoxically, despite the majority of its citizens who were in favor of 
preservation of some type of state arrangement of Czechoslovakia, dissolution happened. 
It is visible from the Table 2. , the least favorable option in both Slovakian and the Czech-
lands was complete dissolution. Accordingly, Czech and Slovak politicians completely 
disregarded the will of the majority of people without giving them an official way to 
express their opinion- referendum. This act of separation without consent of its citizens has 
been criticized by many as a possible failure of democracy (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 139). 
But nevertheless, as we will see in the continuation of this Chapter, there were some 
obstacles which were more question of high politics. 
Table 2. Preferred State Arrangements (November 1991- July 1991) in Czech-lands (CR) 
and Slovakia (SR) (in percentages)  
 
Type of State Arrangement 
November 1991 May 1992 July 1994 
CR              SR CR               SR    CR           SR 
Unitary state 39 20 34 12 38 14 
Federation 30 26 28 33 19 27 
“Land-based republic” 20 6 22 6 18 8 
Confederation  4 27 6 31 3 30 
Two independent states 5 14 6 11 16 16 
 know 2 7 4 7 6 5 
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 Reasons of dissolution were definitely more political in nature and also strongly 
rooted in the disagreements over economic reforms.  Fir tly, a whole debate started in early 
1990 and it developed into something that is commonly-k own as “hyphen war.” It was a 
dispute over the official name of Czechoslovakia. Unsurprisingly, Czechoslovakia had 
changed its name three times. From Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to Czecho-Slovak 
Federative Republic and finally to the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic which was 
at the same time the last name of the former state. Aft r the elections in 1992, it was obvious 
that the standpoints of two prime ministers were not going toward the same direction. 
Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir Mečiar and Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus had 
totally different and incompatible visions of the future of Czech and Slovak state. Mečiar 
preferred more decentralized confederation, while Kaus preoccupied with economic 
reforms, wanted “tighter federation” (Leff Skalinik, 1996, pp. 130-131). Very soon 
Mečiar's party Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko -HZDS became the source of Slovak 
nationalism and supporter of confederal vision of the state. Mečiar was a really influential 
political figure at that time that managed to arouse nationalistic emotions in Slovaks. 
Mečiar even asserted that Czech politicians were not iterested in the preservation of 
common state, but rather with “causing its disintegration and putting the blame on Slovaks” 
(Fisher, 2006, p. 46). What additionally contributed o tightening relation was the fact that 
President Havel was apolitical and isolated himself from the Civic Forum. Havel didn't use 
his authority and reputation, which was far beyond f constitutional borders, in order to try 
to save Czechoslovakia.  
Secondly, initial conditions and prospects for transition to democracy in the Czech 
Republic were way better than in Slovakia. Czechs have always been more modern and 
developed society and they felt some kind of superiority toward Slovaks. This became 
especially visible when Klaus started his radical, Washington consensus-inspired economic 
reforms at the beginning of the 90s. Unemployment rose dramatically and Slovak economy 
simply started to stagnate even more. Therefore, the pace of Czech market reforms was not 
suitable for Slovakia in the short-time period. Both Czech and Slovak politicians were not 
able to find a common solution which would have been viable and without some serious 
constitutional changes (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 188).  
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Thirdly, the disintegrative potential was mainly rooted in the non-changed Soviet-
style-federal constitution. This kind of constitution was not a solid and stable ground for 
the establishment and further development of the federal republic. Namely, the 
Czechoslovak inherited Soviet-style constitution that was specific due to its blocking 
characteristics and three centers of power. The constitutional power of blocking was 
extremely high and legislative act could be passed only if over 60% of all members in both 
Slovak and Czech Chamber of Nations, as well as in the Chamber of Peoples would vote 
in favor or against. This aggravated any future, possible constitutional revision resulting in 
a political deadlock which accelerated dissolution of Czechoslovakia (Linz & Stepan, 
1996, p. 330).  Moreover, both Czech and Slovak prime ministers had a veto power over 
each other which created additional deadlock for decision-making.  
Lastly, the Czech-Slovak stalemate was even more fueled by the fact that 
Czechoslovakia was vastly segmented and there was no state-wide party that entered the 
National Assembly except the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia- KŠC. This means 
there was no overarching party which was representing s ate interests (Leff Skalinik, 1996, 
p. 134). 
 All in all, as we have seen, there are several factors which triggered the final 
disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Either way, each country after the dissolution enjoyed 
its full autonomy while creating its own policies. Nevertheless, with the 2004 accession to 
the EU, both Slovakia and the Czech Republic re-married each other, but this time under 
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3. Five arenas of consolidated democracy 
The Czech Republic has a solid democratic skeleton since the institutions were formed 
from above and apriori to democratization process (Mansfeldová, 2006). Even though 
democracy in the Czech Republic as we may guess can hardly be challenged by another 
form of governance, there are still several improvements that should be crafted for a 
democracy to be fully consolidated. Therefore, thisChapter will investigate the five 
major, inter-relating arenas which assemble the puzzle of a consolidated democracy. 
Each arena needs support from another one in order to have fully functioning 
democratic society.  Firstly, this thesis will deal with a short explanation of single arena. 
Secondly, detailed analysis of each arena of a modern consolidated democracy in the 
Czech Republic will follow. 
 The arena of civil society entails various self-organizing groups who are relatively 
independent of the state and have freedom of association and communication. The fully 
functioning civil society comprises of citizens who are actively taking part in election, 
generating political alternatives and monitoring government. By political society, we 
refer to the arena in which free and inclusive electoral contestations are being held. 
Furthermore, political and civil societies are complementary to each other. What this 
thesis will investigate under the arena of rule of law are rules and laws which are part 
of legal culture- constitutionalism. The rule of law is a clear and hierarchical set of 
norms interpreted by an autonomous judicial system and respected by civil and political 
society. These three arenas are preconditions for the achievement of a consolidated 
democracy. Two final, supportive arenas of a consolidated democracy are state 
bureaucracy and economic society. By arena of statebur aucracy, we mean a usable 
state bureaucracy led by new democratic government. While the arena of economic 
society in a consolidated democracy requires is institutionalized market represented in 
the framework of socio-politically accepted norms, institutions and regulations. 
Centrally-planned economy is being replaced by the market economy where state 
interventions are reduced to its minimum. Free trade, free enterprise and relatively free 
determination of prices are characteristics of market economy (Linz & Stepan, 1996, 
pp. 7-15).  
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 All in all, rule of law (Rechtsstaat) and constitutionalism, human rights protection, 
market economy reforms, integration with NATO and the EU, and the principles of 
civil society and individual economy are the main political goals according to Přibán 
& Young (1999) which are to be fulfilled during the process of democratic transition. 
Moreover, these goals coincide with reforms in Linz& Stepan’s five arenas of 
consolidated democracy. Throughout the next chapters of this thesis we are going to 
investigate development of aforementioned political goals in the framework of five 
arenas of consolidated democracy.  
 
3.1 Civil society 
The Czech Republic gained a reputation of a country with dynamic democratic 
transformations. The acquired status could be mostly owned to the rapid and abrupt 
economic reforms. However, economic reforms were not the only changes that occurred 
in Czech society after 1989. Elicited by the collapse of regime and free elections, Czech 
civil society started to prosper. The underground dissi ent scene of Czechoslovakia, led by 
the members of Charter 77, had been inspired by Western rock icons and their music. After 
the Velvet Revolution, Western popular culture gradually started to penetrate into the every 
sphere of human interference. John Lennon’s picture on the wall of Havel’s apartment, 
Havel appointing Frank Zappa as “Special Ambassador to the West on Trade, Culture and 
Tourism,” (Maštalíř, 2006) were the prelude for embracing Western values and opening of 
civil society. Unfortunately, mere imitation of the West was not enough for calling one 
country a consolidated democracy. Reconstruction of a civil society was a complex task 
and development of democratic mindset of citizens couldn’t happen overnight.  
 Civil society is a comprehensive term which includes freedom of association and 
participation in elections, as well as resurgence of free media. Furthermore, civil society 
can be interpreted as a buffer zone between the stat  and individual citizen. The role of 
civil society is of a great significance since active civil society can help deepening and 
consolidation of democracy, as well as generation of political alternatives.  As mentioned 
before, all five arenas of consolidated democracy are interconnected, as well as 
interdependent on each other. Thus, arena of civil society needs support from the arenas 
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such as rule of law, state bureaucracy and economic soc ety (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 14). 
But nevertheless, in this Chapter, we will mainly focus on changes that occurred within the 
civil society before 2004. 
 Before the more detailed analysis of several components of civil society, this thesis 
will investigate general attitude of Czechs toward democracy. As reported in Table 3. , we 
can see that Czechs had rather positive view on democracy in 1998. The vast majority of 
Czechs (almost 90 percent) favors democratic politica  system. Similarly, 84.8 percent of 
citizens share an opinion that democracy has its own flaws, but is better than any other 
form of governance. As Mansfeldová (2006) points out, “attitudes which at first glance 
might signal a return to communist interventionism could be also interpreted as a reaction 
to extreme neo-liberal policies” that were prevalent during the time of Klaus government 
(p. 116). All in all, generally positive attitude of people toward democracy and the 
awakening of citizens’ democratic mindset made a good environment for further boosting 
of democracy in the Czech Republic. 
Table 3.  Attitudes toward democracy, 1998, %, Czech Republic  
 Very good Fairly 
good 





37.0 48.1 7.1 1.7 4.8 
 Strongly 
agree 






problems but it’s 
better than any 
other form of 
government  
32.4 52.4 6.9 1.6 6.7 
Source: (Mansfeldová, 2006, p. 103) 
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 Political involvement and participation are of cruial importance for the 
development of civil society arena. Interest in politics was extremely high immediately 
after the revolution in November 1989. In 1990, 72.5 percent citizens declared themselves 
as “very interested”, while 27. 5 percent declared as “interested” in politics. In addition, 
96.8 percent of the electorate had actually participated in elections (Mansfeldová, 2006, p. 
105). However, “the first free elections were not quite standard democratic elections with 
competition between well-developed political parties declaring different programs and 
representing interests of different social groups” (Večerník & Matějů, 1999,p.230). They 
were rather in function of overwhelming and spontaneous opposition that wanted to 
overthrow old, communist party. Next elections in 1992 tended to be more structured and 
organized in terms of the left-right division between political parties (Večerník & Matějů, 
1999,p.230). Nonetheless, the number of citizens who had been engaged in politics in the 
next elections declined sharply. For instance, in 1998, only 55.9 percent were interested in 
politics with election turnout of only 74 percent (Mansfeldová, 2006, p. 105). In 2004 
Czech citizens were able to vote in elections for the European Parliament for the first time. 
The turnout of these elections was extremely low- only 28.3 percent while the EU-25 
average was 45.47 percent (European Parliament, 2014). Altogether it seems that Czech 
citizens have lost their illusion and enthusiasm which they had at the beginning of the 90s. 
Up to the some extent Czechs are apolitical, but still they can change their government 
democratically and it is their individual right to decide whether they will vote in free and 
fair elections or not. 
 Besides electoral participation and political interest, freedom of association is the 
next important segment of civil society. According to Mansfeldova (2006), the 
opportunities for participation raised with the development of associational landscape into 
more pluralistic one. In 1995, Law on Public Benefit Corporations (Companies) (Act No. 
248/1995) was adopted by the Parliament promulgatin establishment of public benefit 
organizations that work under non-profit principle (Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management& Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p. 8). Moreover, 
as legally stipulated in Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Czech Republic, citizens are guaranteed right of petition and free 
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association. 1Even though the number of voluntary organization increased, citizens’ 
membership in them is rather low. Civic membership in churches and political parties 
seemed to be one of the least attractive while sport and leisure time associations were the 
most popular (p.106). Freedom House (2005) Report states following “Czech citizens may 
assemble peacefully, form associations, and petition the government. Trade unions and 
professional associations function freely. Judges, prosecutors, and members of the armed 
forces and police may not strike.” Moreover, freedom ratings, civil liberties, and political 
rights in the Czech Republic were assessed with the best grade “one” by Freedom House 
(2005). 
 Another important part of active civil society is uncensored, free media. Under the 
communist regime TV, radio newspapers were directly controlled by the communist party. 
However, one of the bright spots in the information- scarce lethargy were Radio Free 
Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). RFE&RL had a great broadcasting mission for the 
countries behind the Iron Curtain. Namely, RFE and RL represented an unbiased and 
professional “surrogate” broadcasting whose main challenge was operating in “information 
-poor environments ”(Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, 2016). In 1995, RFE&RL 
moved their headquarters from Munich to the former Czechoslovak Federal Assembly 
building in Prague. Today, the headquarters are settled in the new, highly secure building 
located in the suburb of Prague. RFE&RL served as the ource of inspiration both for Czech 
dissidents, and opposition against communist governm nts in the whole CEE. These two 
broadcasting stations became the symbol of free and independent media. Besides RFL& 
RL’s role in the history of media, the real establishment and consolidation of public 
information channels started with the Velvet Revoluti n in 1989. In March 1990, press law 
was amended and came into the force allowing private newspapers to publish. As later 
regulated in Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech 
Republic, everyone has the right to express its own pinion in various forms while 
censorship is not allowed. 2Accordingly, the former state centralized system of media 
disappeared. Dozens of new journals were established at the beginning of the 90s, from 
various daily newspapers to tabloids such as Ble k. But still the state continued to control 
                                                                    
1
 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic, Articles 18. and 20., Ch. 2. 
2
 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic, Article 17., Ch. 1.
 28   
 
printing and distribution institutions since the privatization process didn’t occur overnight. 
Very soon Czech versions of worldwide magazines such as Elle, Burda, Cosmopolitan, 
and Playboy found their way to the Czech press market. What is very specific for Czech 
print media is that most of them, except Právo (previously called Rude pravo), are owned 
by foreign media conglomerates (Kroupa & Smid, 2005, pp. 1-4). Improvements in press 
could be seen in the topics of the concern in the newspapers’ articles. Some Czech 
newspapers are highly dedicated to the revelation of corruption cases and public 
mismanagements in the Czech Republic (Jancsics, Láštic, Solon-Lipiński, & Zelinger, 
2012, p. 50). 
The slowest change occurred with TV broadcasting sice the state had a vast 
influence in this sphere. The reason why government tr mendously had censored television 
was to the fact that television is the most powerful so rce of information for citizens (Leff 
Skalinik, 1996, pp. 112-118). Before, the only TV broadcaster was Czechoslovak 
Television owned directly by the state. After 1989, various TV stations started to emerge. 
With the split of the state, Česká televize 1 (ČT1) and Česká televize (ČT2) were established 
by the law and keep the status of independent public corporations regulated by the 
Parliament (Kroupa & Smid, 2005, p. 1).  In 1994, Nova TV has appeared as the first private 
nationwide TV station mostly designed as an entertainment channel greatly inspired by the 
Western TV programs. Mansfeldová also(2006) reports marginally higher confidence level 
in TV media in comparison to print media (p.112).  
 The arena of civil society in consolidated democracies entails both arts and 
literature not subordinated to political goals and ideology of the regime. During the 
normalization period, freedom of creativity and cultural expression in arts and literature 
was harshly restricted. Writers like Milan Kundera and Pavel Kohout fiercely criticized 
communist totalitarian regime in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, they were both forced to 
leave Czechoslovakia. With a dismantling of the communist regime, arts and literature 
became free and unrestricted. One of the contemporary most eccentric Czech artists is 
David Černý. He gained public attention in 1991 by painting a Soviet tank in pink color. 
Another controversial installation was the insertion of two men urinating on a pond which 
is in the shape of Czechoslovakia. If these acts had occurred under the communist regime, 
the author would have been punished. This is only the confirmation that artists and writers 
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are able to express their opinion freely and to criticize political society without further 
consequences. However, what became troublesome for them was the fact that arts became 
in function of commercial censorship since the states subsidies for culture dwindled (Leff 
Skalinik, 1996, p. 118).  
What constitutes a “healthy” civil society is the existence of equal human and civil 
rights, as well as ineluctable political rights. These rights are embodied in the Czech 
Republic's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, declared as part of the 
constitutional order as of December 16, 1992, and amended in 1999. This Charter is not 
built in Czech constitution directly, but as stipulated in Article 3 of the Constitution of the 
Czech Republic, it still has the same force as constitutional law.3 More details about the 
Charter and rights regulated by it will follow in Chapter 3.3 as part of the analysis of rule 
of law arena. However, when it comes to the protection of minorities, the Charter is not 
always an absolute guarantor of the same. As a consequence of a decade- long isolated life, 
Czechs tend to show some xenophobic features. As previously mentioned, Czech society 
is relatively ethnically homogenous which up to thesome point facilitated transition to 
democracy in terms of political representation and ethnic cleavages between political 
parties. But nevertheless, as other countries in CEE region, the Czech Republic also 
experienced the problem of Roma question. Roma minority is often socially excluded and 
lack both human and civil rights. The media is one f the main tools which contributed to 
the social exclusion of Roma minority, as well as wrong, public depiction. Furthermore, 
Czech society has strong tendencies toward marginalization of Roma people on the labor 
market (Sedléková, 2006). The most controversial law in regards to the Roma minority was 
so-called “Roma clause.” This law stipulated conditions under which citizen of the Slovak 
Republic and other non- Czechs might apply for Czech citizenship. The most contentious 
requirement was a demonstration of a clean criminal record for the preceding five years 
which applied to everyone, except ethnic Czechs. This law had mostly affected Roma 
minority which caused thousands of Roma people lacking the citizenship. In 1996, 
citizenship law was amended by the setting of the condition of two years in a sentence 
instead of clean criminal record for the previous five years (Leff Skalinik, 1996, pp. 171-
                                                                    
3
 The Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 3., Ch. 1.  
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172). Situation additionally improved in 1999 when the new law restored citizenship to 
many residents, including Roma, who were subject to discrimination. Moreover, in 2001, 
the National Assembly adopted legislation for the protection of ethnic minority rights. The 
law's provisions entail the establishment of a governmental minority council (Freedom 
House, 2002). Therefore, we could say that the Roma minority is becoming more integrated 
and socially included in Czech society.  
The whole debate about the rights of minorities may lead us to the question of 
solidarity and tolerance among citizens which are th  most prominent values of civil 
society. Tolerance toward homosexuality generally rose in comparison to the situation 
before 1990. As a result of political and economic changes which occurred after 1989, 
many people lost their jobs which created a huge discrepancy between the newly emerged 
class of capitalist profiteers and losers of the transition process. Thus, inequalities among 
people simply rose and solidarity with the poor lowered. Unsurprisingly, 62.9 percent of 
respondents share the opinion that the government should be more involved and provide 
more help for the poor (Mansfeldová, 2006, pp. 113-6). 
 To conclude, “Reconstructing civil society was also about the process of rebuilding 
the region’s distinctively European heritage, indicative of what was later called a ‘return 
to Europe’ ” (Falk, 2011, p. 329). It prepared Czech society for embracing values of the 
European Union engraved in Article 2 TEU which are human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities.4  
 
3.2 Political society  
Political parties and free, competitive elections are vital for the establishment of democratic 
rule in post-communist state systems. As mentioned i  the introduction, due to the vast 
complexity of the topic, this thesis will focus on the democratic changes which took place 
until 2004. Therefore, in this Chapter, it won’t be possible to deal with the development of 
party and electoral systems until nowadays. Withal most of these changes had actually 
                                                                    
4
 Treaty on  European Union, Article  2., Title I. 
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occurred before 2004 and the structure of party and electoral systems haven’t changed 
significantly from 2004. The only substantial change was the introduction of direct 
elections for president in 2013. 
 After the era of political party monism, the Czech Republic faced with the 
establishment of political parties and free and fair elections. Under no circumstances, we 
could say this was an easy task. Political society was rebuilt from the ground up. For the 
decades citizens were exposed to only one source of ruling power which was disguised in 
the communist party. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was exceptionally 
inflexible since it suppressed any kind of pluralism and possible political alternatives. The 
political stalemate which troubled the Czech Republic was over at the end of 1989 and 
country was getting ready for the injection of political pluralism. Although the restructuring 
and reconstructing had started, there were many who seri usly doubted in Central and  
Eastern European democracies criticizing both politicians for their incapability and lack of 
knowledge of citizens’ preferences, as well as voters’ vague preferences (Kitschelt et al., 
1999, p. 80). 
In line with its bureaucratic-authoritarian communist heritage, the Czech Republic 
adopted “a uniformly depersonalizing system of democratic rules with closed list 
proportional representation and the weak presidency.”(Kitschelt, et al., 1999, pp. 108-109). 
Unlike, Poland which didn’t set the threshold for parliamentary representation at the 
beginning of its transitional process, the Czech Republic introduced the mandate threshold 
of minimum 5 percent. (Olson, 1997, p. 184). The Constitution of the Czech Republic, 
adopted on December 16, 1992, in Articles 5 and 6 legal y secures free and voluntary 
formation of a political system which is established on grounds of free competition between 
political parties and the basic democratic principles. Moreover, the rule of the majority, 
generated by free votes, is the main actor in decision- making process, but nevertheless 
final decision should be enacted in accordance withthe protection of minorities.5 
When it comes to the organizational structure of the most important legislative 
institution in the Czech Republic -the Parliament, we can say that it has is an ordinary 
bicameral structure. It consists of two chambers: lower chamber- the Chamber of Deputies 
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 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Articles 5. and 6., Ch. 1. 
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and upper chamber- the Senate.  The Chamber of Deputies consists of 200 representatives 
while Senate has 81 representatives. As stipulated in Article 18(1) of Constitution of the 
Czech Republic, elections for the Chamber of Deputis of the Parliament of the Czech 
Republic are organized every four years. Members are elected directly by universal adult 
suffrage in electoral constituencies by proportional representation.  As laid down in Article 
18(2) of the constitution, the Senate members are elected every six years in single-seat 
constituencies elected by two-round runoff voting with one -third of member renewed 
every two years. 6 
          In June 1990, after 44 years, the first, democratic and free elections were held in 
Czechoslovakia. According to David Olson, new party systems in Central Europe 
experienced three phases: unity, fragmentation, and co solidation (as cited in Leff Skalnik, 
1996, p. 162).  Civic Forum in Czech lands and its Slovakian counterpart Public Against 
Violence, emerged as absolute winners of the very first elections. As presented in Table 4. 
, Civic Forum became an uncontested winner in the Czech Republic, with 53.15 percent of 
votes with no other significant party threats on the horizon.  However, the first elections’ 
outcome hasn’t provided us with a clear-cut and recognizable picture of the future shape 
of the party systems (Leff Skalnik, 1996, p. 100). At that time political party system was 
still in infancy, without distinct cleavages. Thus, this period could be considered as Olson’s 
first phase which was unity of political parties. Relative unity was established due to the 
fact that the main goal was to topple down the old, communist regime. Hence, the 
programmatic formation of the parties developed more seriously and deeply after the 
regime change. 
Playwright and previous leader of Charter 77, Vaclav H vel became president, but 
very soon distanced himself from Civic Forum. The Civic Forum wasn’t a political party 
nor was it internally unified. It was comprised of members with various political and 
economic standpoints whose opinions started to becom  strikingly diverge. Furthermore, 
Kitschelt et al. (1999) claim that Havel, “inspired by anti-party conception of democracy”, 
lacked the political support of political party behind him (p.109). Hence, under these  
                                                                    
6
 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 18., Ch. 2. 
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Table 4. Elections in the Czech Republic 
Source: (Kischelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Toka, 1999, p. 119) 
 June 1990 June 1992 June 1996 
 Votes % Seats Votes % Seats Votes % Seats 
Civic Forum 53.15 66     
Civic Movement (OH)/Free 
Democrats (SD), SD-LSNS 
  4.60 0 2.05 0 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)    29.73 76 29.62 68 
Civic Democratic Alliance 
(ODA) 
  5.93 14 6.36 13 
Left Bloc/ Communists (LB/ 
KSCM) 
13.48(KSCM) 14 14.05(LB) 35 10.33(KSM) 22 
     1.40(LB) 0 
Czech Social Democrats  (CSSD)   6.53 16 26.44 61 
Liberal Social Union(LSU)   6.52 16   
Christian Democratic Union/ 
People’s Party (KDU-CSL) 
8.69 7 6.28 15 8.08 18 
Republican Party (SPR-RSC)   5.98 14 8.01 18 
Movement for Local 
Democracy- Society for Moravia 
and Silesia (HSD-SMS) 
7.89 9 5.87 14 1.14 ͣ  
Pensioners for Life Securities 
(DZJ) 
    3.09 0 
Democratic Union     2.80 0 
Other parties   14.51 0 0.70 0 
       
Effective number of parties 3.18 1.89 7.69 4.80 5.33 4.14 
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circumstances, disintegration of Civic Forum appeared to be inevitable. Moreover, 
disintegration had a vast influence on further party developments in the Czech Republic.  
 If we turn back to Table 4., we can see that during the election in 1990, Communist 
Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), as The KSČ's most important successor party, 
didn't disappear from the political scene. In addition, KSČM gained solid 13.48 percent of 
votes and entered the Parliament with ten seats (Kichelt et al.1999, p. 117). Generally, 
the communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe had been changing immensely while 
trying to accommodate to a new political environment. For instance, in Hungary 
communist parties transformed into the social democratic parties, while in Poland they 
were dissolved. In Slovakia, they merged with already existing ones. Only in the Czech 
Republic, despite Havel’s efforts to outlaw the communist parties, did the orthodox KSČM 
cultivate and preserve the old Marxist doctrine of C mmunist ideology (Kirchcik, 2012). 
KSČM, rather classified as a non-democratic or protest party remained very dogmatic and 
nostalgic toward the old regime. Furthermore, in the subsequent elections KSČM, 
supported by a loyal group voters, remained stable. Th  1990 elections just proved the 
existence of so-called “residual cleavage” (communism vs. anti-communism) in Czech 
party politics.  As presented in Table 4. Christian Democratic Union/ People’s Party (KDU-
CSL) won only 8.69 percent of votes. Accordingly, another potential cleavage between 
church and state wasn’t substantially visible since Cz ch society was highly secular. This 
religious cleavage remained intact and constant, but not significant in Czech party system 
(Hloušek & Kopeček, 2005, pp. 8-9).  The turning point and definite departure from the 
leftist camp occurred when Vaclav Klaus, finance minister of interim government, used 
the advantage of aforementioned dissolution of Civic Forum to establish a new party - 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS). ODS, a liberal-conservative party, was founded on grounds 
of free-market approach and emphasized strong liberal market reforms (Kitschelt et al., 
1999, p.120). Klaus swung political anchor to the center-right which marked the beginning 
of temporary primacy of liberal-democratic parties over the leftist ones. Hegemony of 
right-center liberal wing parties was additionally confirmed by the elections in 1992 when 
Klaus led a four-party coalition government of ODS, the Christian Democratic Party 
(KDS), the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) and 
the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). ODS, as a leading party, wasn’t playing on a card 
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of social protectionism of citizens nor it wanted a paternalistic “hand of government” to be 
evident (Večerník & Matějů, 1999, p. 183).  Exactly this new epoch of clustering of 
political parties around salient issues could be considered as the beginning of Olson’s phase 
of the fragmentation of the party system. 
With a final dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel became a president of the 
Czech Republic on January 26, 1993. As previously seen, center- right parties in the Czech 
Republic followed the path of free market reforms with economic transformations being 
central and important to their political agenda. This contributed to the formation of a more 
structured and clear left- right political spectrum in the Czech Republic. Complex political 
reality started to cluster around new experts on the right, the dissident based movement in 
the center, and the communist and ex-communists on the left side of political spectrum 
(Leff Skalnik, 1996, p. 101). Kitschelt et al. (1999) argued that based on theoretical 
considerations of post-bureaucratic authoritarian communism in the Czech Republic, it was 
predictable that both strong programmatic formation a d competition would have 
occurred. More precisely, in the Czech case, powerful market-liberal parties developed 
thus, the greatest programmatic crystallization and highest polarization occurred right over 
salient economic issues. This caused robust party competition over the economic issues 
and consequently, the division to the left and right based on socio- economic cleavage 
(Kitschelt et al., 1999).  
Still volatile and relatively fragmented, the party system in the Czech Republic was 
confronted with new elections in 1996 when center-left Czech Social Democratic Party 
ČSSD appeared as a major challenger to the perennial hegemony of Klaus’ center-right 
liberal camp (as seen in Figure 1). ČSSD, led by charismatic Miloš Zeman, emerged as the 
most popular opposition party propagating the mixed program of liberal democracy and 
social protectionism (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p.121). In the 1996 parliamentary elections, 
Klaus and his coalition partners won only 99 out 200 seats, while ČSSD seriously started 
to endanger ODS’s position and won 61 seats. One of the biggest surprises of the 1996 
election was an extreme, radical right party Republican Party (SPR-RSČ) that won a quite 
solid support of 8.01 percent of votes. (as presented in Table 4.)   Only one year after the 
elections, in the midst of economic crisis, Klaus’ government fell due to alleged corruption 
in his party. Consequently, ODS split into two parts: ODS and US. New elections were 
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scheduled for 1998(June) while in the meantime, a new i terim, caretaker government was 
established consisting of US, ODA, and KDU-ČSL.  In the new elections in 1998 ODS lost 
a significant group of voters who voted for US instead. Thus, ODS wasn’t able to gain 
enough votes of support to establish the government. The only alternative was formation 
of “opposition agreement” that allowed the formation f the minority government of the 
ČSSD with the parliamentary support of the ODS. Nationalist- populist SPR-RSČ, a major 
surprise of 1996 elections, vanished from the political scene. The reason of this re-
distribution of votes lays in a fact that majority of SPR-RSČ voters were natural ČSSD 
voters who were attracted by SPR-SRČ’S populist, racist, anti-integration rhetoric in 1996 
elections. Nevertheless, in 1998 ČSSD returned their support (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p.121; 
Večerník & Matějů, 1999, p.238). ČSSD-ODS opposition agreement continued to exist 
until the 2002 general elections.  
If we observe Figure 1. and Figure 2. ie. location of voters in the political sphere in 
time of elections in 1996 and 1998, we could notice an obvious development of an 
independent axiological cleavage. This implies that the division between liberal and 
authoritarian corresponds to socio-economic cleavage of the left and right (Hloušek & 
Kopeček, 2005, p. 11). Or as Več rník & Matějů affirmed(1999) libertarianism-
authoritarianism axis is constructed by the usage of attitudes to socio- economic issues 
(p.266). As previously mentioned, the main polarization actually occurred around socio-
economic issues.  Thus, based on Figure 1. and Figure 2, we could notice that  voters of 
the right-wing civic parties (ODS, ODA),  were conce trated  in right- liberalism quadrant. 
Conversely, ČSSD and KSČM, and SRP-RSČ were concentrated in leftist-authoritarian 
quadrant while KDU-ČSL kept central position. The situation in the 1998 elections slightly 
changed, but this is not so significant for the conclusion of this comparison. The conclusion 
which might be inferred from this is the confirmation of Kitschelt’s hypothesis that 
economic liberalism is associated with political liberalism and economic paternalism with 
authoritarianism which is applicable both for voters and political parties (Več rník & 
Matějů, 1999, p. 268). If we return to the question of the salience of issues, we could say 
that political and cultural issues were less important, thus, parties were less polarized and 
competitive in these spheres (Kitschelt et al., 1999). The aim of these figures was to 
envisage to the reader the location of voters in important political parties in the two- 
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Figure 1. Location of voters in the political space defined by the two main axes in 
1996(factor scores) 
 
Figure 2.  Location of voters in the political space defined by the two main axes 
in 1998(factor scores) 
 
Source: (Večerník & Matějů, 1999, p. 267) 
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dimensional space during the very important period for creation of Czech, stable political 
party system. 
In  the 2002 elections, ČSSD, under the leadership of a chairman Vladimir Špdla, 
won the majority and formed a coalition government with KDU-CSL and the Freedom 
Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU) (Freedom House, 2005). Moreover, in 2002, 
president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel finished with his twofold mandate. Former 
Finance and Prime minister, Vaclav Klaus in 2003 became a new presidnet. Having 
president from one party(ODS) while having the government formed by another party 
(ČSSD) only contributed to pluralist, mature, and consolidated Czech party system. 
 As the Czech Republic was getting closer to accession to the EU, Czech political 
parties were framing their attitude towards the EU accession. But firstly in June, 2003, an 
overwhelming majority of Czech citizens said “yes” on referendum about the Czech 
accession to the EU.  However, the parties’ opinions t ward the accession to the EU greatly 
differed.  KSČM’s rhetoric was highly Eurosceptic and completely against EU integration. 
From their perspective, the Czech Republic should have withdrawn membership 
application interests (KSČM, 2005). Taking middle stance of soft Euroscepticism, ODS 
wasn’t against the EU membership as such, but rather gainst federal vison of the EU. 
Lastly, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU supported functional Europeanism in which they 
support further European integration until it serves state or party interests (Hloušek & 
Kopeček, 2005, pp. 13-14). However, pro-EU vs. non- EU cleavage was not so prominent 
and deep in Czech party politics. 
 To conclude, we could say that Czech political society until 2004 was quite 
consolidated and evolved into a more structured form. One of the three main preconditions 
for the EU accession, as set in Copenhagen criteria, is political stability. Political stability 
wouldn’t be possible without free and fair elections and structured and functional political 
party system. The situation additionally improved in 2002 when several amendments to 
electoral law were added and D'Hondt electoral formula was introduced (Hazan & 
Leyenaar, 2002, p. 182).  
 39   
 
3.2.1 Political society in Slovakia  
Meanwhile, party politics in Slovakia turned into relatively opposite direction. Due 
to the lower level of secularization and relative pr dominance of Catholic Church, Slovakia 
was faced with state-church cleavage from the beginning; thus, the main rivalry game 
occurred between civic movement PAV and the conservative- oriented Christian 
Democratic Movement (KDH) (Hloušek & Kopeč k, 2005, p. 14). Political parties in 
Slovakia were mainly created around national cleavages, as well as around the question of 
preservation of national identity. After the disintegration of PAV in spring 1991, Vladimir 
Mečiar established the center, populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 
whose main political agenda was “defending Slovakia from disruptive economic reform 
and Pragocentrism” (Leff Skalnik, 1996, p. 102). Vladimir Mečiar portrayed himself as 
someone who was ready to take “paternalistic role” and preserve national identity of 
Slovaks.  HZDZ national conservativism was completely different from Czech center-
right, liberal ODS. Mečiar’s HZDZ combined nationalism with a reform program attractive 
to Slovaks. However, as Hloušek & Kopeček (2005) argue “HZDS started to act in the way 
which challenged the democratic game rules” (p.16). Formally, Slovakia was a 
parliamentary democracy, but in practice, it was more semi-authoritarian. Mečiar was a 
strong authoritarian figure who strengthened the powers of the presidency and impeded 
Slovakian consolidation of political society. Mečiar’s six years-long rule in Slovakia could 
be described as a really turbulent one, full of political and corruption scandals and 
controversies. During his rule, Mečiar survived several falls, however in 1998 election he 
won a “Pyrhic victory.” Despite the fact he gained majority of votes, his HZDS wasn’t able 
to form a government. Eventually, the government was formed by SDK (Slovakian 
Democratic Colaition) (Fisher, 2006, p. 166). 
Therefore, if we reflect on the Slovakian case, we could say that the Mečiar- Anti-
Mečiar cleavage was the most conspicuous in Slovak party politics, unlike the Czech 
Republic where socio-economic cleavage was the mostpr minent. In addition, the Slovak 
party system was politically even more destabilizing since there has always been a national 
cleavage between Slovaks and Hungarian minority (Hloušek & Kopeček, 2005). The 
chances for stabilization and consolidation of democratic rule emerged with the erosion of 
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Mečiar’s power and the establishment of a new party- Direction (Smer) ahead with Robert 
Fico in 1999. 
 
3.3 Rule of law 
“There’s no way around it; the rule of law is back” is a famous quote by Vaclav Havel who 
stressed the importance of re-establishment of the rule of law as the foundations for the 
further democratic ventures (as cited in Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 1). The foundation for a 
genuinely functioning law-based state can be ascribed to a large extent to constitutionalism, 
as the skeleton of one state’s democratic rule. Thus, constitutionalism as the primary 
organizing principle of Linz& Stepan’s rule of law arena tends to safeguard that all powers 
of the state are concentrated and controlled by laws and norms enshrined in the constitution. 
With a rise of Fukuyama’s idea of absolute victory of liberal democracy, liberal 
constitutionalism became a solid basis for the building Western- type liberal democracies. 
Liberal constitutionalism by definition makes a state  guarantor of a bundle of liberal and 
civil rights which are derived from principles of justice and outlined in the constitution 
(Přibán & Young, 1999, pp. 13-15). However, we should bear in mind that rule of law is 
not just a set of rules, but it also involves “a certain institutional culture, an overall approach 
to the functioning of legal and governmental institutions ” and “some assurance of a 
commitment of to those principles on the part of the state themselves” (Přibán & Young, 
1999, p. 61). According to Peter Paczolay, with a transition to democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe, creation of a new “democratic legal system” was essential. The creation 
of “democratic legal system” includes: 
a) Institutional- procedural component which entails completion of the criteria of a 
rule of law and constitutionalism  
b) Substantive component -which is the fulfillment of s me basic democratic values, 
for example, liberty and equality (as cited in Krygier& Czarnota, 1999, p.110).  
Hence, this Chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the reconstruction of the rule of law, 
covering both institutional-procedural component (constitutional changes), as well as 
substantive component.  
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If we return to a post-totalitarian era not only in Czechoslovakia but in whole CEE 
region, we could notice that constitutions were rather fictive, designed and adjusted to the 
unlimited role of the communist parties. As Hannah Arendt asserted, party and state acted 
as double authority and law was more a façade of political voluntarism (Arendt, 1962, p. 
ch. 12). Classical separation of powers, denied by Marxist-Leninist, was practically not 
incorporated into the Soviet-style constitutions. What was specific for the Soviet-style 
constitutions was the relatively “unified power structure” with the power monopoly 
concentrated in the Parliament. (Krygier & Czarnota, 1999, p. 118). Therefore, with the 
change of regime, restructuring of aforementioned “democratic legal system” commenced. 
Codification of liberal and democratic values, separation of powers, and strengthening of 
the executive branch were only some of the main tasks nd preconditions for further 
progress of a democratic legal order. Drafting a new constitution and demolition of 
communist, restrictive heritage in it, wasn’t an easy task. The continuation of Soviet- style 
constitutions in a post-communist country block, including Czechoslovakia, appeared to 
be a normal phenomenon. What legislators did in the most cases at the beginning of law 
reforms, was the mere abolishment of provisions which referred to one party rule system, 
while adding new democratic and liberal provisions to the old constitutional framework. 
Another specificity of the constitutional systems of CEE countries was the fact that despite 
the constitutional division of powers, the supremacy of the Parliament remained (Krygier 
& Czarnota, 1999, pp. 116-122).  
After this short description of the Soviet-type constitutions, the focus will be shifted to 
the rebuilding of the rule of law in the Czech Republic. The emergence of new political 
and economic structures required a legal democratic system to support them. However, 
Czechoslovakia didn’t change the constitution immediat ly after the collapse of the 
communist regime. Post-communist, Czechoslovak Federal Assembly adopted only a set 
of constitutional amendments. Therefore, we could say that “the old legal order remains 
valid within the framework of the amended constitution while its legitimacy rests upon the 
old constitution as well the old legal order” (Krygier & Czarnota, 1999, p. 116). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2.5 on the Velvet Divorce, debat s about the future of the country 
started from the beginning of the democratic transition. While Czechs were more occupied 
with the creation of a long-awaited federal constitution, Slovaks had forestalled the Czechs 
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and created the Constitution of Slovak Republic which was adopted on September 1, 1992. 
Consequently, Czechs legislators didn’t have enough time to draft the Czech Constitution 
which remarkably influenced wording and formulation of the Constitution itself (Přibán & 
Young, 1999, pp. 24-25).  
The most important period which served as a source for modern Czech constitutional 
tradition was the period of the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938). As Huntington 
(1996) claims, previous experience with democracy is just an advantage for one country at 
the beginning of the transition. In Czech case, right this democratic experience proved to 
be a source of legitimacy for the further development of Czech constitutional tradition. The 
Czechoslovak Constitutional Charter from 1920 was democratic and enormously 
influenced by the democratic constitutions of other Eu opean states. The 1920 Constitution 
was a guarantor of basic human rights and freedoms and it represented a solid foundation 
for further improvements of Czech democratic and constitutional tradition. The difference 
between the Czechoslovak Constitution from 1920 and the Czech Constitution from 1992 
lays in a fact that latter is not neutral in its values (Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 27). The 
Constitutional Court delivered the first judgment on December 21, 1993, with the 
following opinion that “The Constitution of the Czech Republic is not founded on 
neutrality with regard to values”, but more rather “it incorporates certain governing ideas, 
expressing the fundamental, inviolable values of democratic society.”7 This judgment had 
great implications on the later development of legal order in the Czech Republic.  
All in all, Czech Constitution conforms to the requirements of modern 
constitutionalism and represents an adequate basis for a law-based state. As proclaimed by 
Article 1 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, “The Czech Republic is a sovereign, 
unitary, and democratic state governed by the rule of aw, founded on respect for the rights 
and freedoms of man and of citizens.” 8Therewith in the continuation of this Chapter, more 
detailed examination of other segments of Czech legal order will follow. Firstly, we will 
deal with the separation of powers given by the Constitution, as well as with the status of 
the Czech Republic's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Secondly, with the 
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8
 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 1., Ch.1.  
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new Constitution, a multitude of laws came into force. Unfortunately, this thesis won’t 
discuss all these laws, but rather some controversial laws such as lustration laws. Other 
significant laws like tax laws, laws on privatization and restitution will be analyzed under 
the framework of economic society arena to which they actually belong. 
The legislative power of the Czech Republic is vested in the Czech Parliament 
(Parlament České republiky). The Czech Parliament, as mentioned in the politica  society 
arena, has a bicameral structure consisting of lower chamber- Chamber of Deputies 
(Poslanecká sněmovna) and upper chamber- Senate (Senát). With the introduction of a 
bicameral parliament in the Czech Republic, a role of the legislative branch is doubled. In 
the same manner, executive power is also more or less doubled between government and 
the president, as well as judicial power between th Constitutional Court and the general 
judiciary courts (Krygier & Czarnota, 1999, p. 119).  
The Czech bicameralism has its roots in the 1920 Czechoslovak Constitution. In 1992, 
when the Czech Constitution had been crafted, the existence of Senate was under the 
question. The Czech National Council which performed the role of the Parliament of the 
Czech Republic in the federal Czechoslovakia was automatically transformed into the 
Chamber of Deputies of CR or lower chamber (as stipulated by Article 106(1) of 
Transitional and Final Provisions of the Czech Republic Constitution). According to 
Article 106(2) of the Constitution, the Senate’s duties should be finalized by the 
Provisional Senate that should be put in the functio  by the Chamber of Deputies. 9  
Nevertheless, the constitutional law which should establish the Provisional Senate was not 
adopted by the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, the Chamber of Deputies performed the 
role of Senate. The Senate was re-established in 1996, four years after the adoption of the 
Czech Constitution. (Kysela, n.d; Semihradská & Klazar, 2006).  
The lower and the upper chamber of the Czech Parliament are asymmetric since the 
Senate has significantly weaker legislative powers than the Chamber of Deputies. The 
Chamber of Deputies is the main legislative and budgetary body, while the Senate has a 
role of correcting and controlling the legislation passed by the lower chamber. The 
legislative role of the Senate depends on the type of laws which are being adopted. 
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Constitutional laws may be approved only if 3/5 of b th lower and upper chambers of the 
Parliament express their consent, while electoral laws entail a simple majority or half of 
the votes in both chambers.  In the ordinary legislative procedure, while dealing with other 
laws, the Senate can only amend or return the legislative act to the Chamber of Deputies. 
In addition, the Senate can be outvoted by the Chamber of Deputies (Kysela, n.d). 
Executive power in the Czech Republic is shared betwe n Government and the 
President of the CR. On the one hand, as stipulated in Article 67 (1), the Government is the 
highest executive body.10 However, according to Article 68(1), the Government is 
subordinated to Chamber of Deputies.11 On the other hand, the Czech Republic has a 
tradition of highly influential presidents who have more power than given by the 
Constitution. Thus, the role of President in the Czech Republic is not purely ceremonial. 
Due to a strong and influential President, a role of the Government is diminished. 
Therefore, Government’s cabinets are subordinated not o ly to the Chamber of Deputies 
but also to the President. This results in a fact tha he President has more power than the 
Prime Minister. In the political science literature, this conflict is often denominated as a 
“problem of the dual executive” (Krygier & Czarnota, 1999, p. 123). 
Judicial power in the Czech Republic, as mentioned above, is comprised of 
Constitutional Court and general courts. As set in Article 91 of the CR Constitution, court 
system of the Czech Republic is composed of the Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, superior, regional, and district courts.12 The performance of these 
general courts will be analyzed in the arena of state bureaucracy in the next Chapter.  
 During the post-totalitarian era, the constitutional court that would have 
safeguarded human rights and freedoms was not welcom d.  The role of the Constitutional 
Court was weakened and rather fictive. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, 
as an independent part of the judicial breach, was established on June 15, 1993 (Přibán & 
Young, 1999, pp. 82-85). The Constitutional Court is often perceived as a guardian of the 
constitutionality (Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 28). Moreover, the role of the Constitutional 
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 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 67 (1)., Ch.3.  
11
 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 68 (1)., Ch.3.  
 
12 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 91., Ch.4. 
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Court is the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms (Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 82). 
Jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court, as laid down in Article 87(1), are not only the 
supervision of the constitution but also state burea cracy, local governments, as well as the 
supervision of the harmonization between adopted laws nd the constitution. We won’t 
analyze in the detail rules and procedures of the CR Constitutional Court, but it is important 
to emphasize that constitutional complaint as a legl remedy of the individual may be 
submitted (as stipulated in Article 72 (1) a) of the Constitutional Court Act):  
 “by a natural or legal person, if she alleges that er fundamental rights and basic 
freedoms guaranteed in the constitutional order (hereinafter “constitutionally 
guaranteed fundamental rights and basic freedoms”) have been infringed as a result of 
the final decision in a proceeding of which she was a party, of a measure, or of some 
other encroachment by a public authority (hereinafter “action by a public 
authority”).”13 
One of the main signs of a strong legal democratic system is the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Successful protecti n of already mentioned rights, by the 
constitution, may be considered as a relevant and challenging test for legislator-makers. 
Soviet-style constitutions used to embody a long list of fundamental rights, without 
respecting them actually in practice (Krygier & Czarnota, 1999, p. 126). Thus, in order to 
have a fully democratic society, both procedural and substantive component of the rule of 
law need to be fulfilled.   
 In Czech case, fundamental rights and freedoms are enshrined in the separate 
document named Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic or 
Bill of the Basic Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic. The Charter was adopted by 
Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia in 1991, however, after the dissolution of the 
federation, it remained as a single document of Czech constitutional order. Unlike the 
Czech Republic, in Slovakia the Charter was embedded ir ctly in the Constitution. The 
European Convention on Human Rights, with its positivi t approach of human and civil 
rights, greatly contributed to the creation of the Charter. With the coming into force of 
Article 10 of the Constitution, as of January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic was ready for 
                                                                    
13
 Constitutional Court Act set by Act No. 182/1993 Coll. On the Constitutional Court. 
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adaptation and ratification of international treatis by which the Czech Republic become 
directly bound (Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 48).  
The Charter constitutes of six Chapters, covering a wide range of individual’s rights 
and freedoms, from basic, fundamental rights and freedoms till the rights of judicial and 
other legal protection. However, after almost 50 years of non-democracy and deprivation 
of human rights, some time was necessary in order to restore the basic rights and norms to 
the society. Therefore, as Istvan Pogany explained “constitution making, the formal act of 
drafting or revising a constitution, does not lead utomatically to constitutional 
transformation” (Pogany, 1996, p. 568). The substantive component needs some time to 
put roots down, as well as to be fostered and upgraded on the institutional-procedural 
component of the democratic legal system. 
To conclude, the Czech Republic definitely fulfills Linz&Stepan’s (1996) primary 
organizing principle of the rule of law: constitutionalism. The hierarchy of norms and legal 
culture is respected in arenas of both civil and political society (p.10). Furthermore, the 
Czech Republic managed to harmonize its laws with EU acquis. European Commission 
(2003) just one year before the accession confirms that “The translation and revision of 
acquis acts provided by the Czech authorities has been conducted efficiently and 
cooperation with the EU institutions has been smooth” (p. 15).  
  In the following Subchapter this thesis will deal with one of the most controversial 
and disputed laws in the Czech legal history:  lustration laws. Lustration laws divided 
Czech public opinion and their legality is still under the question.  
 
3.3.1 Lustration laws  
A special Subchapter of the analysis of rule of lawarena will be devoted to the succinct 
examination of highly controversial and according to many defective lustration laws. 
Lustration laws (lat. lustratio-purification by sacrifice) were a set of laws which were an 
inevitable part of legislative reforms of the majority of post-communist countries. The main 
aim of lustration laws was to purge state administration institutions and government 
apparatus from persons who were associated with the previous communist regime (Přibán 
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& Young, 1999, p. 56). Lustration laws or as Stephen Holmes (1994) calls them in his 
article The End of Decommunization “witch hunts”, required checking of person’s previous 
background in order to examine if the person under th  suspect previously had ties with 
the ruling communist elite (p.33).  
 Lustration law entered the force on October 4, 1991, when the government enacted 
lustration on “person-by-person basis.” Lustration law stipulated three categories of 
collaborations: A, B and C depending on seriousness and type of collaboration (Krygier & 
Czarnota, 1999, p. 249). The fact which only contributes to the Czech’s sincere 
understanding of lustration was a situation when Czechoslovak Parliament had firstly 
lustrated itself and then adopted a law on lustration (Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 62). Purges 
in the post-communist state administration institutions were normal up to the certain extent, 
but the scope of lustration laws in the Czech Republic was wider. The Constructional Court 
widened the scope of lustration by an annulment of the provision on general exclusion. 
Thus, respecting the principle of fairness, the lawbecame valid for all that have been 
rehabilitated (Přibán & Young, 1999, p. 76). 
 From the beginning of lustration process, opinions about lustration greatly 
diverged. On the one hand, some people shared an opinion that lustration was highly 
necessary and essential for successful adaptation of western, liberal model of democracy.  
While others put more emphasize on the fact that laws on lustration were possibly linked 
to human rights abuses. Moreover, some people considered lustration a revenge of the 
previously oppressed (Přibán & Young, 1999, pp. 66-80). 
The main point of this Subchapter is not to judge whether lustration laws were 
inappropriate or not, but rather to show how democracy had its own “weapons” to fight 
with transforming communist elites.  Eventually, the Constitutional Court decided that 
“lustration was permissible and did not violate anyo e’s human rights” (Přibán & Young, 
1999, p. 78). 
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3.4 State bureaucracy  
Max Weber, a world eminent sociologist, claimed that bureaucracies are an essential part 
of the modern world with their role of managing all vast administrative requirements which 
are imposed by social systems (as cited in Giddens, 2013, p. 826). Thus, having a “healthy” 
state apparatus which can assure certain rights to it  citizens, as well as provide them with 
main services, can be considered as a basis for good democratic governance. According to 
Linz & Stepan(1996), state bureaucracy as such needs to be independent and usable by the 
democratic government. In addition, support from all four other arenas is crucial for the 
establishment of functioning state apparatus (pp. 11-14).   
The collapse of communist government in 1989 triggered the restructuring and 
complete political overhaul in the Czech Republic. Institutional reforms were crucial for 
getting rid of obsolete communist bureaucratic structures and old, communist elites. 
Neither the mere adaptation of new democratic legal system nor the pure imitation of 
Western institutions in some cases (so- called “empty shells” institutions) were sufficient 
for an independent functioning of state apparatus. Bojan Bugarić nicely captured the 
problem of “empty shells” instructions in Central and Eastern Europe. Namely, he argued 
that: 
“while the administrative structures in Central and Eastern Europe look, on the 
surface, similar to their Western counterparts, they operate very 
differently…National structures are strongly embedd in an national legal, 
political and cultural environment”(Bugarić, 2006, p.16-18).  
National legal, political and cultural environment as well as suspicious organizational and 
individual behavior in the post-communist countries was something that was not always 
directly influenced by law and very hard to eradicate (Jancsics, Láštic, Solon-Lipiński, & 
Zelinger, 2012, p. 15). Despite all these hardships, the Czech Republic, instigated and 
motivated by EU accession negotiations, started to struggle with institutional reforms. The 
main precondition for the accession to the EU was harmonization of national laws with EU 
law standards (i.e. adoption of acquis communautaire). Thus, Czech state apparatus 
underwent a process of several institutional reforms and transposition of legal norms and 
rules in order to be harmonized with EU standards. 
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 During the reign of communism, the distinction betw en political party and state 
apparatus was extremely blurry. Moreover, due to the extreme dependency of allocation of 
economic resources on central, administrative decisions, the corruption became endemic 
and normal (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005, p. 114). As Sandlots & Taagepera (2005) 
argued “The command economies of the communist era cr ted structural incentives for 
both demanding and offering illicit private payments” (p.110). So undoubtedly, the Czech 
state bureaucracy was significantly infected by corruption during the communist era. 
However, it seemed that corruption practices back then were relatively acceptable and 
nobody used to talk about them openly. Thus, with the change of the regime, supported by 
market economy reforms, corruption only emerged to the public and became the biggest 
problem troubling post-communist society in transition. 
 First of all, we need to define what corruption actu lly is. A traditional definition 
of corruption coined by Transparency International ( .d.) is following “Corruption is the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” According to Pedersen & Johannsen (2006), 
corruption can be divided into three categories: petty corruption, administrative 
malpractice, and grand corruption. Grand corruption, is the most notorious one and it 
occurs when democratically elected politicians became informally included in actions of 
private actors who manage to change procedures of voting or law-making according to 
their interests. Consequences of grand corruption are very harmful for democratic 
consolidation since it undermines newly-emerged democratic political system (pp.317-
318). With the structural change of the whole system, still incomplete and undeveloped 
system of state administration was a perfectly fertile ground for the further development of 
corruption. Corruption, as a “deeply rooted malignancy” of the Czech post-communist 
society, affected almost every level of state administration, from the lower level officials 
to the top level officials and politicians (Jordan, 2002). So if we are speaking about 
impediments in the arena of state bureaucracy in the Czech Republic, it is inevitable to 
define them in terms of corruption.  
In this Chapter, NIS (National Integrity System) assessment approach will be used 
in order to set groundwork for efficiency in preventing and combating corruption in state 
apparatus. The NIS is a comprehensive approach developed by Transparency International 
that consists of 13 institutions presented in Table 5. below. These 13 institutions, divided 
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into three pillars, are key for the analysis of well-integrity system and anti-corruption 
measures of one state (Jancsics et al., 2012, p. 13). Under the analysis of state bureaucracy 
arena in this Chapter, we will analyze pillars of the government and public sector with the 
focus on the strengths and weaknesses within each pillar.  Non-governmental pillar won’t 
be analyzed since as its name suggests is not part of the state bureaucratic structure.    
 Table 5. The National Integrity System (NIS) pillars 
Government Public sector Non-governmental 
Legislature Public Administration Media 
Executive Law Enforcement 
Agencies 
Civil Society 
Judiciary (Prosecution)14 Political Parties 
 Supreme Audit Institutions Business 
 Electoral Management 
Body 
 
 Ombudsman  
 Anti-corruption Agencies  
Source: (Jancsics et al., 2012, p.13) 
 
3.4.1 Government  
The governmental structure consists of legislative, executive and judiciary breach which 
are interdependent on each other and function jointly. The Czech legislative breach, as part 
of a democratic legal order, was profoundly analyzed under the arena of a rule of law. 
Therefore, this Subchapter will focus on an analysis of executive and judiciary breach as a 
governmental part of state bureaucracy arena in the Czech Republic. 
                                                                    
14 In the Czech and Slovak NIS studies Prosecution is assessed as a pillar separated from the Law 
Enforcement Agencies. 
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During the communist governance in the Czech Republic, state executive power 
was extremely centralized and dependent exclusively on the communist party. However, 
solid democratic governance entails decentralization and it is most efficient when it is 
practiced on the local or regional level. As Illner (2011) pointed out “territorial self-
government is an expression of the right of population living in a territory to manage 
independently the territorial affairs within the scope defined in the constitution and 
legislation” (p.510). Thus, the unitary state Czech Republic from the beginning of 1993 
had been engaged in debates over the strengthening regional governance and new 
administrative division of its territory. In December 1997, Czech Parliament approved the 
Constitutional Act on the Creation of Higher Territo al Self-Governing Units (European 
Commission, 1998, p.8). The process of the decentralization of Czech territorial 
administration was successfully completed with the abolishment of the 73 districts as of 
January 1, 2003. The Czech Republic became divided nto 205 municipalities with 
extended competencies which are the basic self-governing units and 14 regions (more 
precisely 13 regions and the capital, Prague having a status of the region) which are the 
higher self-governing units. With this act, newly established regions, as well as 
municipalities obtained several competencies mostly in areas of education, health care, 
environment etc. (European Commission, 2003, p.11). 
According to Article 68 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the Government 
is the supreme organ of executive power consisting of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister, and Ministers. 15As previously mentioned, cabinets (15 of them altoge her) have 
rather a weak position since they are subordinated both to the Chamber of Deputies and 
the President. But nevertheless, the focus of this Subchapter won’t be on structural analysis 
of cabinets, but rather on strengths and weaknesses of both Czech Government and 
judiciary system in general.  
The biggest weakness of the central executive Czech Government is certainly 
corruption. During the 90s, Czech Government was shken by several corruption scandals 
and political affairs. Czech high-ranking politicians were quite often the main actors of 
grand corruption scandals, illegal privatization, ad other frauds. We will only mention 
                                                                    
15
 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 68., Ch.3.  
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some of them. In 1997, Vaclav Klaus, back then the Prime Minister and leader of ODS, 
found himself in the middle of a political affair. Namely, Klaus ahead of his ODS was 
accused of receiving of allegedly illegal donations for party financing from anonymous 
funds. This strongly influenced on the political stability of the government and tarnished 
ODS reputation. Several ministers resigned and urged Vaclav Klaus to submit his 
resignation which resulted in a final collapse of Klaus’ government.16 Besides this political 
affair, corruption scandals like Bamberg affair (bamberská aféra), aféra Český dům and 
Zemanův kufřík were only some cases of high-level corruption in which elected and senior 
public officials were involved.  
The judiciary system, as a part of the arena of state bureaucracy, consists of the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court andsupreme, regional and district 
courts in general. The Constitutional Court, discused under the arena of the rule of law, 
has its specific jurisdiction and does not belong to the system of ordinary courts. (as 
stipulated in Article 87 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic)17 In this part, judiciary 
system will be analyzed more generally, without individual examination of specific 
functions of each court. Moreover, the NIS approach proposes separate analysis the public 
prosecution and the courts of justice due to a difference in their performances. Another 
reason for the separate analysis is the fact that public prosecution in the Czech Republic is 
formally part of the executive branch, rather than p rt of the judiciary (Jancsics et al., 2012, 
p.18). Therefore, the public prosecution will be analyzed under the public sector.  
One of the biggest improvements in the judiciary is the establishment of the 
Supreme Court (in January 2003), as the highest instance judicial body, as specified in the 
Article 92 of the Constitution.18 The Supreme Court controls final decisions of the other 
High Courts and safeguards equal interpretation of the law by aforementioned Courts and 
other district courts (DPADM & DESA, 2004, p. 6). 
                                                                    
16
 Česka televize (2009, November 28), Tzv. „sarajevský atentát“ odstartoval zatím největší politickou krizi 
v ČR. Retrived from: http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/archiv/1432352-tzv-sarajevsky-atentat-odstartoval-
zatim-nejvetsi-politickou-krizi-v-cr.  
17
 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 87. , Ch.4. 
18
 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 92. , Ch.4. 
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The greatest “virtue” of judiciary system of each country is its independence from 
political influences. The Czech judicial system in 2004 was still vulnerable due to the fact 
that judges were nominated by the Ministry of Justice and then appointed by the president. 
Consequently, this leaves some space for possible political interferences (Semihradská & 
Klazar, 2006, p. 354). Furthermore, all judges, excluding the Constitutional Court judges, 
were allowed to be a part of political parties or movements (European Commission, 2003, 
p. 12). However, the Act on Courts and Judges which entered into force in April 2002, 
could be considered as a clear step toward the moreself-governed judiciary which would 
considerably lower political influence over the judicial system. In addition, a creation of 
Judicial Councils and Judicial Academy strengthened both quality of judicial services and 
the independence of the judiciary in the Czech Republic in general (European Commission, 
2003, p.12).  
Judges’ remunerations, as regulated by the special law, were higher than those of 
civil servants. But the difficulty which appears in the Czech judicial system is that judiciary 
constantly has been understaffed. In May 2003, the capacity of Czech judicial system was 
3043 of judges while only 2633 judges’ positions remained filled (European Commission, 
2003, p. 12).  According to Semihradská & Klazar (2006), due to the shortage of not only 
judges but also administrative and technical support average length stood at district courts 
was 592 days. Nevertheless, the situation regarding the efficiency of the civil judgments 
enforcements visibly improved in 2001 with the establishment of the Chamber of Judicial 
Executors under the Act on Private Bailiffs (pp. 354-355). 
 When it comes to citizens’ access to courts, European Commission (2003) reported 
that “access to justice is satisfactory”, but pointed that citizens are not aware of their 
entitlements (p.13). Furthermore, one improvement is hat citizens are also protected 
against potentially biased and malicious courts’ decision-making by the procedural 
regulation of civil criminal and administrative proceedings (Jancsics et al.,2012, p.41).  
 
3.4.2 Public sector 
The public sector covers a wide range of institutions whose main aim is providing different 
governmental services to its citizens. 
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Public administration together with prosecution could be considered as the weakest 
institutions in the Czech Republic, as assessed by Visegrad Integrity System Study 
(Jancsics et al., 2012, p.15). The main flaw of the public administration sector is the fact 
that it is over-politicized. For instance, high official public servants in the majority of cases 
were chosen exactly by the politicians.  Moreover, inadequately educated public servants 
and relatively low remunerations were an additional burden in the state administration 
(European Commission, 2003, p.11). All these factors contributed to development of the 
corruption. Public administration employees are mostly usceptible to petty corruption 
ranging from day-to-day corruption of lower public officials till administration malpractice 
of higher officials (Semihradská & Klazar, 2006, p. 318). 
 However, notable progress had been made with the introduction of the 
comprehensive Civil Service Act in May 2002 whose implementation started in 2004. This 
Act aims at improving professional standards of the officials in central state administration 
offices making them more independent, stable, liable etc. The Civil Service Act guarantees 
more transparency as well as merit-based recruitment policy. Furthermore, this Act 
establishes a new salary system for public servants which is based on both 12 different 
salary grades and classes (DPADM & DESA, 2004, pp.10-11). 
Public prosecution is another weak link of the public sector as evaluated by 
Visegrad Integrity System Study. Great political interferences and hierarchical and non-
transparent structure make public prosecution organ in the Czech Republic still very weak 
and vulnerable to corruption (Jancsics et al., 2012, p.15). 
The organizational structure of public prosecution is susceptible to direct political 
influences since the Prosecutor General is nominated by the Minister of Justice and selected 
by the government. The Prosecutor General can be also removed by the government on the 
Minister’s proposal without special, explicit reason . The Minister of Justice jointly with 
the Prosecutor General has the authorization to remov  lower-level prosecutors. In the 
same light, lower-level persecutors need to abide possible instructions in regards to 
individual cases given by their higher-level prosecutors. Moreover, higher-level public 
prosecutors have a right to drop out individual cases from lower public prosecutors. All 
these aforementioned factors strikingly undermine prosecutors’ independence which 
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resulted in no judgments of severe corruption cases from the beginning of the 90s (Jancsics 
et al., 2012, p.19).  
What additionally burdens the prosecution organ is the shortage of prosecutors 
combined with their insufficient educational qualifications. In 2003, European 
Commission (2003) reported 971 prosecutors’ places being filled out of 1250 prosecutors 
which were required (p.12). The positive side of the public prosecution organ was the fact 
that the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office had been assigned a role of anti-fraud 
coordinating service (AFCOS) under the auspices of European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
(European Commission, 2003, p.51).  
Public procurement in the Czech Republic, as a mediator between a private business 
sector and state institution system, should be more transparent and less prone to corruption 
(Jancsics et al., 2012, p.68). However, improvements were to be introduced with the Act 
No. 137/2006 Coll. Government Procurement which wasfinally adopted in 2006.19 
Law enforcement agencies, more precisely police, continued to be labeled as 
oppressive part of public sector due to its reputation gained in communist era (Lizal & 
Kočenda, 2000, p. 5). Nevertheless, as the European Commission (2003) reported, Ministry 
of Interior was engaged in various actions to fight against fraud and corruption. Moreover, 
Ministry was working on adequate training of police stuff and adaptation of police Code 
of Ethics (p.46). 
The positive side of the public sector in the Czech Republic is definitely watchdog 
institutions: the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) and Ombudsman. Both Ombudsman and the 
SAO are state institutions that are functioning in a transparent way (Jancsics et al., 2012, 
p.49). SAO is the most efficient body in fighting aainst corruption that audits and 
rediscovers possible deficiencies and misconducts in the public sector. The reason why the 
Czech Supreme Audit Office is efficient may be owned to the fact that it has “sufficient 
powers, financial means and human resources to exercise.” In addition, the SAO is 
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  Act No. 137/2006 Coll. Government Procurement.  
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extremely careful and demanding in the selection procedure of its employees (Jancsics et 
al., 2012, p.40). 
 The Ombudsmen’s Office was created by the Act on Public Protector of Rights in 
November 2004. The role of Ombudsman is protection and counseling of citizens who 
think that they experienced some kind of discrimination or injustice committed by state 
institutions (DPADM & DESA, 2004, p. 8).  
 To conclude, the Czech state apparatus is to the great extent independent and 
functions on the basis of “democratically sanctioned laws and procedures established by 
political society” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 14). However, more aggressive anti-corruption 
campaign, reducing political influences and more transparency in public sector are key 
recommendations for improvements in the arena of state bureaucracy (Jancsics et al., 2012, 
p.68). 
 
3.5 Economic society 
“The worst thing about Communism is what comes after” (as cited in Judt, 2005, p.665) is 
a famous quote by Adam Michnik, distinguished Polish e sayist, and former dissident, who 
acknowledged possible difficulties which might appear as a consequence of the process of 
transition. In Schumpeterian terms, this could be described as a “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter, 1976).  “Creative destruction” denotes a continuous process of destruction 
of one economic structure on which new economic structu e is created. What occurred in 
Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 could be certainly interpreted as a “creative 
destruction.” Namely, with a definite fall of the communist realm, Fukuyama’s prophecy 
of the final victory of capitalism was about to be fulfilled. The former socialist countries 
were ready to start the building of new capitalist market structure on the ruins of their 
dysfunctional socialist, central planned economies.   
The aim of this Chapter is to analyze the last aren of consolidated democracy 
puzzle which is economic society. Linz& Stepan (1996) asserted that consolidated 
democracy would hardly ever exist in a command economy or in the pure economy. What 
is considered to be an optimal solution is the economic society that “mediates between state 
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and market” (p. 11). Or in other terms, solution could be found somewhere in between of 
Adam Smith’s metaphor “invisible hand of market” and “visible hand of government.” In 
order to have fully functioning economic society with the institutionalized market as a 
guiding principle of organization, one country needs support from other arenas as well. A 
democratic legal system created by political society and recognized by civil society, and 
administered by state bureaucracy are supportive preconditions for the development of 
“healthy” economic society (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 14).    
 The Soviet model of centrally planned economy in Czechoslovakia was introduced 
at the beginning of a rule of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1948. With the 
nationalization of property, collectivization of agriculture and abolishment of private 
enterprises, state significantly increased its interfer nces over the whole economy. After a 
very short time, five years plans and excessive stat  involvement in the overall economy 
showed to be very inefficient for Czechoslovakia. Chances for potential economic reforms 
emerged at the beginning of the 60s with a new, leader Alexander Dubček. Nevertheless, 
the attempt to loosen the regime and introduce a set of economic and political reforms was 
suppressed by the Soviet Union during the Prague Spring in 1968. What followed is a 
complete hypertrophy of the economy which lasted until the beginning of transition to the 
democracy in 1989 (Gregory & Stuart, 1999, pp. 468-9).   
 Both political and economic reforms went hand in ha d in Czechoslovakia, as well 
as in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The initial conditions for the 
launching new economic reforms in Czechoslovakia were contradictory and uncertain. On 
the one hand, Czechoslovakia didn’t experience Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms unlike 
Poland and Hungary where partial economic liberalization reforms had been initiated 
already far before the 90s. Thus, the private sector in Czechoslovakia was almost non-
existent until the beginning of privatization in the 90s. An additional burden for the Czech 
economy was the fact that together with other socialist countries, the Czech Republic (back 
then Czechoslovakia) was part of the Soviet economic integration organization, Council 
for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) which rest icted and numbed Czech’s 
trade potentials (Dlouhý, 2001, p. 175). Just for the illustration, almost three-quarters of 
the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia was oriented exactly toward the COMECON (Berend, 
2009, p. 55). On the other hand, Czechoslovakia had several factors which were very 
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favorable for the transition to market economy. Stable macroeconomic factors such as 
relatively low foreign debt and hidden inflation were the main bright spots of the Czech 
economy. Furthermore, the Czech Republic was regardd as a country with highly 
educated workers and a strong industrial tradition (Dlouhý, 2001, p. 175). 
 Shock Therapy and Gradualism were two schools of thought that were main actors 
of the economic transition debate in Central and Eastern Europe from the beginning of the 
90s. According to Svjenar, shock therapy or “bing-bang” style reforms were concentrated 
on rapid “macrostabilization, price liberalization a d dismantling the institutions of the 
communist systems” (Svejnar, 2002, p. 5). Shock therapy included swift, almost 
“overnight” implementation of deregulation, macroecnomic stabilization, marketization 
and privatization reforms. Western experts such as D vid Lipton, Andres Åslund, and 
Jeffrey Sachs were the main proponents of the neolib ral, Washington prescription which 
was imbued with swift “bing-bang” approach policy. Conversely, gradualist approach 
included more gradual and slower pace of reforms, as well as cautious liberalization.  In 
Svejnar’s terms gradualism involved “the development a d enforcement of laws, 
regulations, and institutions that would ensure a successful market-oriented economy” 
(Svejnar, 2002, p. 5).  
The Czech Republic was one of the countries that wholeheartedly embraced shock 
therapy approach and after some short time gained a epithet of successful of quick 
transforming economy, favored by many politicians ad theorists and foreign investors 
(Dlouhý, 2001). While in other countries of the region enthusiasm toward market reforms 
quickly declined and was replaced either by national sts or left-wing propagators, the 
Czech Republic was one of the socialist states wereright-wing neo-liberal stream staunchly 
dominated for a longer period of time. The most important figure for the formation of the 
economic transformation policy of the Czechoslovakia was a minister of finance and later 
the first Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus.  Klaus was an advocate of Laissez-faire 
principle and deregulatory policies and he quite ofn used Thatcher neo-liberal rhetoric as 
his main weapon.  Moreover, he wanted a clear-cut break with the communist, centrally-
planned economies and he truly believed that fast and p inful transition was a better option. 
Klaus was devoted to the idea of fully functioning market economy or as he called it 
“market without adjectives” (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 180). He didn’t want to accept 
 59   
 
comprise of a mixed-economy. As Berned (2009) asserts, new political elite clearly 
believed in Western, capitalist economy, and Vaclav Klaus even several times pointed out 
on the map that Prague is geographically more Western than Vienna (p.50).  
According to Vladimir Dlouhý (2001), Czechoslovak Minister of Economy from 1990-
1992, Czech economic reform policy was founded on three main pillars: 
1. privatization and restitution  
2. swift systematic changes (price and trade liberalization, tax reforms, opening of 
free trade etc.)   
3. macroeconomic stabilization which include managing i flation, unemployment, 
establishing new  exchange rate system etc. (p.176). 
 
Systematic changes, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization will be used in order 
analyze arena of the economic society in the Czech Republic more systematically. Due to 
a quite long time span (1989-2004), this thesis won’t be able to capture all trends and 
fluctuations in the Czech economy. The main purpose of this Chapter is rather to explain 
crucial changes which occurred during the transition o the market economy and to prove 
that the Czech Republic fulfills all criteria of Linz& Stepan’s economic society.  
 
3.5.1 Privatization and restitution  
 Capitalism does not exist without private property.  Therefore, with the regime change one 
of the most controversial topics on the economic agenda was the privatization of a state 
economy. Nevertheless, the first and essential step for the establishment of the free market 
economy was the restitution of properties from the state to individuals. 
 During the communist leadership, private ownership was abolished. The 
communist authorities confiscated all private ownership from its citizens without 
additional compensation. With the fall of regime, the question of restitution of property to 
its original owners emerged. The issue of restitution became highly controversial since it 
caused confusion around the fact of to whom the property should be returned (Leff 
Skalinik, 1996, p. 189). The Czechoslovak government favored the idea that the property 
should be returned only to the citizens or their descendants that experienced restitution 
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after the beginning of communist regime in 1948. Communist authorities were afraid of 
possible German demands for restitution of their prope ty if they had set an earlier time 
boundary. Thus, in the first phase, “the subject to restitution were property injustices and 
confiscations done by the hard-line communist regim which occurred on February 25, 
1948 to January 1, 1990” (Gloss, n.d.). Special controversy appeared around the restitution 
of property to churches and to Jewish Holocaust survivors in Czechoslovakia for property 
that was taken over by Nazis in World Word II. In the second phase in May 1994, law on 
the restitution was amended and included the right of restitution to Jewish families. When 
it comes to restitution of property to religious organizations, churches, as the main owners 
of the forests and fields in pre-communist era, got the right to restore their property for 
religious uses in 1991 (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 190). The biggest amount of property was 
denationalized and restituted to private owners in period from 1990-1991 in total amount 
of 200 billion crowns (European Commission, 2013).  
The Czech Republic was the country that pioneered in the fast privatization of the 
state economy. Rapid privatizations signalized “a capitalist revolution” which allowed the 
establishment of a market economy with a free enterprise as the main actor (Večerník & 
Matějů, 1999, p. 70). As aforementioned, Poland and Hungary h d already privatized 
substantial part of their economies before 1989, while in Czechoslovakia in 1989 more 
than 95 percent of the state economy was still based on state economy (Leff Skalinik, 1996, 
p. 189). 
Privatization in the Czech Republic started with so-called “small privatization” of 
small economic undertakings such as restaurants and hops through public auctions opened 
exclusively to Czech buyers (European Commission, 2013). Another method of 
privatization, intended for the privatization of state-owned, large-scale companies in the 
Czech Republic, was “coupon” or voucher privatization ntroduced by law in February 
1991. The Czech “bing-bang” approach to a voucher privatization was quick and relatively 
easy solution which occurred in two rounds: the first one finished in 1992 and the second 
one in 1994 (Berend, 2009, pp. 62-63). A mechanism of voucher distribution was 
following. Each Czech citizen who was older than 18 years had a right to buy a voucher at 
a nominal price fee which he could exchange for the s ares of state companies (Leff 
Skalinik, 1996, p. 192). A citizen had an opportuniy either to keep a share in a new, private 
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enterprise or to sell their shares for money to privatization investment funds. Nevertheless, 
laws on the establishment of privatization investment funds were very liberal and permitted 
anyone to establish a privatization fund (European Commission, 2013). This made a 
fruitful ground for the various privatization frauds and malversations. For instance, one of 
the biggest scams was scams committed by Viktor Kožený so-called “piráta z Prahy.” (the 
pirate of Prague) Namely, Kožený established his investment fund named Harvard Capital 
and Consulting. Thousands and thousands of citizens entrusted vouchers to his fund backed 
by his promise that their vouchers would be redeemed later for a higher price. However, 
this turned to be a deception and Kožený and his loyals transferred the money from the 
fund to the accounts on Bahamas (Novotný, 2015).  
 The banking sector in the Czech Republic wasn’t privatized at the beginning. Banks 
used to control the majority of the investment funds which used to own many large and 
medium enterprises. Accordingly, these enterprises stayed under the control of state which 
turned to be a big mistake since goals of these actors greatly diverged and didn’t cause the 
reorganization in the economy (Berend, 2009, p. 63; Dlouhý, 2001, p.182). Banking 
predominance in the private sector abated with the privatization of banking sector that had 
started in 1998. The bank privatization finished in 2001 together with other big 
privatizations (e.g. telecommunication and gas sector privatizations) (Berend, 2009, p. 64).  
  
3.5.2Systematic changes  
An essential precondition for the establishment of the market economy was the elimination 
of fixed prices set by the state. Price liberalization in Czechoslovakia was introduced 
immediately in 1990 (Berend, 2009, p. 53).  With the abolishment of fixed prices, prices 
were mostly determined by the real production costs and were in line with supply and 
demand of the market. However, extreme and sudden deregulation and liberalization of 
prices might represent a huge financial shock for the population. Thus, the Czech Republic 
continued to marginally control prices in several areas such as housing, healthcare, 
education etc. (Czech National Bank, 2003). Nevertheless, price regulation didn’t meet 
equal reception among population. Namely, price regulation were criticized from the side 
of self-employed and higher professionals whose wages directly came from the market 
economy. On the contrary, government price regulation was welcomed by pensioners since 
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their incomes depend on state redistribution (Večerník & Matějů, 1999, p. 197). As the 
Czech National Bank (2003) reports by 2001-2002 “the overwhelming majority of 
regulated prices had been aligned.” 20 Together with deregulation of prices, new regulatory 
laws on bankruptcy, competition, mortgages etc. were also essential for the proper 
functioning of the market economy in the Czech Republic. However, laws on creditor 
protection and appropriate bankruptcy management were adopted only in 2000 (Berend, 
2009, pp. 56-57). 
As previously mentioned, the majority of Czechoslovak trade before 1989 was 
within the framework of COMECON. With a transition to market economy, it was highly 
necessary for the Czech Republic to open its market. Therefore, the Czech Republic 
became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 1994. In April 
1993, the Czech Republic acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
WTO in 1996 reported that “The current trade policy is based on the principles of market 
economy, free competition and respect for internatio l rules and principles as embodied 
in the WTO Agreement” (World Trade Organization, 1996).  In addition, the Czech 
Republic has been also a member of several, regional trade agreements. More precisely, 
Czechs concluded The Europe Agreement on Association between the European 
Communities in 1995. This agreement represented transi ional economic framework 
(agreement lasted for 10 years) whose main aim was to prepare the Czech Republic for the 
future integration to the European Union, as well as to eliminate tariff duties and barriers 
within the trade in the Union.  The Czech Republic a so signed the European Free Trade 
Agreement (EFTA) in April 1993. The main aim of this agreement is to establish free trade 
regime in the transitional period until 2002.  Morev r, the Czech Republic signed Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), as well as mny other bilateral agreements 
with other countries (World Trade Organization, 1996).   
The Czech Republic also became a beneficiary of Poland and Hungary: Assistance 
for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) which was l unched from the side of the 
                                                                    
20
 Czech National Bank (April, 2003), Price deregulation in the period of transformation f the Czech 
economy. Retrieved from: 
https://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/inflation_reports/2003/2003_april/boxes_annexes/zpinflace_03_ap
ril_b2.html.  
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European Commission as a pre-accession instrument for he financial support. This 
financial assistance was originally intended to Poland and Hungary, however, the Czech 
Republic got an access to this pre-accession instrument in 1993.21    
A new system of direct and indirect taxes (value-added taxes) in the Czech Republic 
legally entered into the force in 1993. The Czech tax system, established “with the aim of 
making resdistributional flows more transparent, “became highly comparable and adjusted 
to the tax system of Western European countries (Večerník & Matějů, 1999, p. 146). Direct 
taxes are paid to the government directly and they can be classified as 1) the income taxes 
that are paid by the legal or natural person; 2) real estate taxes; 3) road taxes. On the 
contrary, VAT taxes are paid indirectly for the goods or services provided. VAT taxes can 
be calculated on the basis of standard or reduced rat . 22Tax system is constantly being 
amended and it very hard to understand all these changes.  
The healthcare system also went through the process of ystematic reforms after 
1989. General Health Insurance Act (1991), the Act on the General Health Insurance Fund 
(1991), and the Act on Departmental,  Health system in transition Czech Republic 
Professional, Corporate, and Other Health Insurance Funds (1992) were set of laws enacted 
which established statutory health insurance model(SHI). SHI model consists of “number 
of quasipublic, self-governing health insurance funds acting as payers and purchasers of 
care, financed through mandatory, wage-based contributions” (Alexa, et al., 2015, p. 20). 
SHI model stipulates that every citizen is obliged to have health insurance. Furthermore, 
this system ensures that government pays the contribution for the unemployed, the elder 
people, and children under 18. Motivation to introduce a competition among health 
insurances existed, thus, in 2004, there were 9 health insurance houses.  Všeobecná 
zdravotní pojišťovna České republiky (VZP) covered 70 percent of both citizens and the 
private insurances’ activities (CERGE-EI, 2004, p. 39). However, the European 
                                                                    
21
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the Republic of 
Hungary and the Polish People's Republic. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/CS/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ae50004.  
22 Act No. 586/1992 Coll. On Income Taxes 
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Commission (2003) reported that “A deeper and a more c mprehensive reform affecting 
the social benefits and the pension system and healthcare is needed” (p.53).  
Previously mentioned pension reforms were also part of the systematic changes that 
came with the change regime in 1989. With ODS victory in 1992, social-liberal version of 
the reforms of the pension and health system which emphasized more universal benefits 
and overall generous approach was abandoned. Vaclav Klaus envisaged more neo-liberal 
version of the pension reforms (Orenstein, 1995, p. 186). Law on the new pension system 
was enacted in 1996. With this law Czech pension system was reformed and consisted of 
two main pillars. The first one is mandatory basic pension insurance which is defined by 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) benefit pension plan. The second, marginal pillar is not mandatory 
and it is defined by the contribution of extra pensio  insurance (CERGE-EI, 2004, p. 37). 
  
3.5.3 Macroeconomic stabilization  
Under the pillar of macroeconomic stabilization in this Subchapter, we are going to analyze 
following indicators: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation, unemployment and 
monetary policy in the Czech Republic.  
 Reforms and macroeconomic trends in the Czech Republic from 1990 to 2004 
could be divided into three periods:  
• 1990-1995, when the Czech Republic successfully made its first steps toward the 
reforms (Dlouhý, 2001, p.189)  
• 1995-2000, when the reforms stagnated, and a seriou crisis shattered the Czech 
Republic in spring 1997 
• 2000- 2004, when the economy started to grow and gra ually recovered from the 
1997 crisis 
In the period from 1990-1994, the Czech Republic managed to survive with 
relatively low inflation, as well as with low rate of unemployment (as we can see in Table 
6.which gives us an overview of three basic indicators of macroeconomic stabilization in 
the period from 1990 to 1995). Inflation initially galloped to 56.6 percent, but it declined 
already in 1992 to 12.7 percent. The unemployment in the period from 1990 until 1994 
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rose in comparison to pre-1989 situation when it almost didn’t exist, but in never reached 
5 percent. GDP declined in the period from 1990 to 1991 by almost 15 percent. (as seen in 
Table 6.) In 1990, fixed exchange rate (or system pegged to other currencies) was 
introduced as a nominal anchor which would lead to macroeconomic stabilization of 
fluctuated economy in transition. The fixed exchange rate with plenty of other factors 
destabilized the economy and caused economic crisis later in 1997. Vaclav Klaus (2006) 
later claimed that “In 1990 the fixed exchange ratewas a key element in the stabilization 
of our economy.”23  Despite negative shock which was caused by the Velvet divorce and 
initial transitional recession, this was the period when the Czech Republic was the most 
efficient in its reforms and actually emerged as a developing market economy (CERGE-
EI, 2003, 5). Already in 1994 due to macroeconomic stability, a solid share of private in 
GDP, and the huge interest of the foreign direct investors, the Czech Republic was 
considered as a country that was already behind the majority of transformation reforms 
(Dlouhý, 2001, p. 179). On the other side, the initial situation in Slovakia was worse than 
in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, Slovaks’ unemployment and inflation rates were even 
lower than rates in the other post-communist countries (Leff Skalinik, 1996, p. 188).  
In the second period from 1995 to 2000 Czech reputation of emerging market 
economy was destroyed by the currency crisis of 1997 which triggered the recession. 
According to Dlouhý (2001) “the absence of strong private financial institutions, the lack 
of adjustments and restructuring in the enterprises (which led to excessive wage growth), 
the absence of regulation of the capital markets and the long-lasting monopolistic position 
of some producers” initiated economic crisis (p.190). The reason of currency crisis could 
be mostly ascribed to the aforementioned fixed exchange rate. The fixed exchange rate 
regime was replaced with the floating exchange system with ±7.5 fluctuations which 
consequently led to the crown depreciation of nearly 20 percent (Dlouhý, 2001, p. 187) 
The government didn’t have any other choice except the introduction of austerity measures. 
What followed was economic downturn characterized by negative GDP growth in both 
1997 and 1998, as well as by decline of both private spending and investments. Inflation,  
                                                                    
23
 Vaclav Klaus (February, 2006), The Economic Transformation of the Czech Republic: Challenges Faced 
and Lessons Learned. Retrieved from :http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-
bulletin/economic-transformation-czech-republic-challenges-faced-lessons-learned.   
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Inflation  10.0 57.9 11.8    
Unemployment  1.7 6.6 5.5    
GDP Growth  -0.4 -16.4 -7.2    















Inflation  9.9 56.6 12.7 20.0 10.7 8.0 
Unemployment  1.1 4.4 2.6 3.5 3.5 2.9 
GDP Growth -1.9 -14.5 -7.1 -0.5 2.5 5.2 















Inflation  10.3 61.2 10.0 23.2 11.7 7.2 
Unemployment  2.4 11.8 10.4 14.0 14.3 13.1 
GDP Growth  -2.0 -15.8 -7.0 -4.6 4.2 6.8 
Industrial Growth  -2.7 -24.9 -13.7 -13.5 6.4 8.4 
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as one of the indicators of macroeconomic stabilization, was more or less under the control 
during to the crisis due to low domestic demand in the combination with rigid monetary 
policy and low prices of goods (CERGE-EI, 2003, p. 7). Above all mentioned, a whole 
economic crisis completely coincided with political turmoils and a collapse of Klaus’ 
government. Despite the serious economic crisis, European Commission (1998)  already 
in 1997 reported that “The Czech Republic can be regarded as a functioning market 
economy”; it “should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the 
Union in the medium term”(p. 12).   
Finally, after 2000, the whole economy, in general, started to recover and develop 
again. The GDP grew by around 3 percent during the four consecutive years, starting from 
1999. The main reason for the acceleration of Czech economy could be owned to the inflow 
of the foreign direct investments (FDI) (CERGE-EI, 2003, p.7). Namely, the Czech 
Republic was a country that had the highest FDI inflow in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the period of 1989-2003. However, almost 50 percent of these had been realized from 2000 
to 2002. Table 7. gives us an overview of the largest FDI in the Czech Republic. As we 
can see, the majority of FDI were in the field of manufacturing, financial, gas and 
telecommunication while the biggest investors were d finitely Germany and the 
Netherlands. 
To conclude, the Czech economy until 2004 was without any doubts fully 
developed market economy with institutionalized market. The recession crisis which lasted 
from 1997 till 1999 only showed that that the Czech onomy was able to resist the market 













Table 7. The Largest Investments in the Czech Republic (in mil. of USD) 
Total Investments Foreign partner, 
County 
Activity, 
time span  
Name of the 
Czech company 








900 Volkswagen, Germany  Cars, 1991-1998 Skoda automobilova, 
a.s. 
1,110 KBC, Belgium Banking, 1999 CSOB 
1,030 Societe Generale  Banking, 2001 Komercni banka 





500 Erste Bank, Austria Banking, 2000 Ceska sporitelna 






450 ABB, Sweden, 
 Switzerland 
 11 companies in total 
420 Phillip Morris USA Tobacco, 1992 Tabak, a.s. 
400 National Energy Corp.,  
El Paso Energy, 
 NRG Energy, USA 
Energy, 1997-1999 Energeticke centrum 
Kladno 
357 Daewoo- Steyr, South 
Korea, Austria  
Vehicles, 1995 Avia, a.s. Praha 
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4. Conclusion   
After an in-depth analysis of five arenas of the consolidated democracy, we are able to 
draw some conclusions and to finally resolve our research puzzle. The main aim of this 
thesis was to offer a more holistic view on democratization process in the Czech Republic 
in the period from 1989 until 2004. Throughout the analysis of Linz& Stepan’s five arenas 
of democratic consolidation applied in the Czech case, we came to the conclusion that 
democracy in the Czech Republic is definitely “only game in the town.” Thus, this research 
only confirmed our working hypothesis that democracy in the Czech Republic until 2004 
was already consolidated. 
  As we previously noted there is a huge gap between el ctoral and consolidated 
democracy. The Czech Republic assuredly surpassed electoral democracy criteria of free 
and fair elections. Democracy in the Czech Republic defined in Linz & Stepan’s (1996) 
terms is consolidated both behaviorally, attitudinally nd constitutionally.  Behaviorally, 
democracy is consolidated since there isn’t any kind of threat which may endanger 
democracy in the Czech Republic. Attitudinal consolidation comes from the high level of 
institutional routinization. Nevertheless, corruption greatly undermines citizens’ 
confidence in democratic institutions and procedures. Constitutionally, the Czech Republic 
is consolidated since rules and norms are embedded in the constitution and in the majority 
of cases they are respected by all four other arenas.  
In the light of all the facts mentioned in the thesis, we can summarize the most 
important factors which have contributed to democrati  consolidation, relying on both 
good initial preconditions and successful reforms. 
Firstly, the Czech Republic has a good geographical position due to which was 
exposed to what Levitsky& Way (2006) call “Western leverage” and “Western linkage.” 
Namely, this means that Czech geographical proximity to the European Union countries 
resulted in government’s “vulnerability to external process of democratization” (leverage), 
and also in many economic, social and diplomatic ties with the West (linkage) (p.382). Or 
in more simple terms, geography matters and the Czech Republic would sooner or later 
have succumbed to the process of democratization, pressured by other democratic 
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neighbors. For instance, positive conditionality given by the European Union was the 
biggest incentive for the Czech Republic which leverag d and accelerated transitional 
reforms.  
Secondly, the Czech Republic had a democratic legacy which served as a source of 
legitimacy and inspiration in the process of transition. Namely, Czech democratic legacy 
rests upon the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) which greatly influenced the 
Czech modern constitutionalism. Thus, Huntington’s (1996) theory that previous 
experience with democracy alleviates democratic transition has proven to be completely 
true in the Czech case. However, democratic culture of citizens which was suppressed for 
almost fifty years needs some time to be fully restored into the Czech society. 
Thirdly, according to Linz& Stepan (1996), ethnical homogeneity only facilities 
transition. The Czech Republic was ethnically homogenous so there were no significant 
minority issues which would destabilize political society. Moreover, Czechs were proud of 
their First Czechoslovak Republic which served them as a source for defining their 
statehood. 
Finally, despite initial conditions that were a good skeleton for the democratic 
transition, the fact that actually mattered the most were democratic reforms from 1989 till 
2004 which we have already analyzed in this thesis. Extreme neoliberal government from 
the beginning of the 90s enhanced the pace of reforms which was highly risky and resulted 
(in combination with other factors) in a complete economic breakdown. However, swift 
economic reforms bore a fruit when the most painful transitional part was over.  
No transition is perfect; and as its name suggests tran ition is not a permanent state 
of affairs, but rather temporary. The Czech Republic in the time span of 15 years has 
changed and immensely improved. Accession to the European Union in 2004 could be 
considered as a special achievement and a mere confirmation of  democratic consolidation. 
The Czech Republic fulfilled Copenhagen criteria set by the European Union which up to 
the some extent overlaps with five arenas of the consolidated democracy.  
 Taking into the considerations all “virtues” and flaws of the Czech transition to 
democracy, the one can conclude that the example of the Czech Republic can definitely 
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serve as a role model of successful and quick transi io  for Balkan and other post-
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